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I. INTRODUCTION
Airline passengers increasingly expect basic airline service as a
matter of law and entitlement rather than as a function of busi-
* Attorney, Hunton & Williams. J.D., cum laude, University of Miami School of
Law. The author presented aspects of this Article at the "Fourth International
Travel and Tourism: Policy, Law and Management Conference," Newcastle upon
Tyne, United Kingdom, May, 2002. The author gratefully acknowledges the
valuable comments on earlier drafts provided by Aaron Comenetz, Jaret Davis,
Esq., Terrance A. Dee, Esq., Dana E. Foster, Esq., Heather Ravich, Esq., Robert D.
Rightmyer, Esq., Loretta B. Todzia, Esq., and Justin B. Uhlemann, Esq. Thanks
also to Yolanda Arnavat-Parga, Rosy Lopez, and Lois S. Randall for substantial
support. This Article was written solely in the author's personal capacity and not
on behalf of or at the request of any other.
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ness and market forces. Unprecedented access to air travel, gen-
erated in large part by low fares, has aggravated, distorted and
reinforced this expectation. The tragic events of September 11,
2001 ("September 11"), during which terrorists hijacked four
commercial jetliners and navigated two into New York City's
World Trade Center Twin Towers and one into the Pentagon,'
necessarily have amplified the role of law and government in the
deregulated airline market. While the law affords Americans a
relatively unfettered ability to travel,2 it has not, as a practical
matter, secured pleasant or hassle-free travel in the modern der-
egulated era. From 1999 through the current Congressional
term, passenger and government outrage with airline' service
and accountability energized federal legislators, themselves air-
line passengers, to present more than three dozen proposals col-
lectively referred to as the "Passengers' Bill of Rights" (the
"PBOR").4 This Article examines and criticizes these popular
and legislative impulses to secure better airline travel exper-
iences within the United States by operation of law.'
I A fourth airliner crashed in rural Pennsylvania after several passengers
counter-attacked the hijackers onboard. JERE LONGMAN, AMONG TH-E HEROES:
UNITED FLIGHT 93 AND THE PASSENGERS AND CREW WiHo FOUGHT BACK
(HarperCollins 2002); see infra text accompanying note 263. See generally Robert
A. Brazener, Annotation, Liability of Air Carrier for Damage or Injury Sustained by
Passenger as a Result of Hijacking, 72 A.L.R. 3d 1299 (1976).
2 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 757, 758 (1966) (establishing that "freedom
to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right
under the Constitution"). But see William Mann, Comment, All the (Air) Rage:
Legal Implications Surrounding Airline and Government Bans on Unruly Passengers in
the Sky, 65J. AIR L. & COM. 857 (2000) [hereinafter Mann, Airline and Government
Bans on Unruly Passengers]; John A. Glenn, Annotation, Validity, Under Commerce
Clause of Federal Constitution, of State Tolls or Taxes On, Or Affecting, Interstate or For-
eign Air Carriers or Passengers, 31 L. ED. 2D 975 (1999).
3 For convenience, notwithstanding differences among air travel providers, the
terms "airline(s)" and/or "carrier(s)" are used throughout this Article to refer to
both major air travel providers that route their flights within a hub-and-spoke
system (see Part III.D.1, infra) and low-fare, specialty carriers such as Southwest
Airlines and JetBlue, which offer point-to-point networks of flights.
4 The subject legislation joins modern governmental and popular-culture ef-
forts to buttress perceived entitlements rather than constitutionally-secured
rights with legislation bearing the historically-significant title "Bill of Rights," in-
cluding, inter alia, Consumers' Bill of Rights, Health Care Bill of Rights, Patients'
Bill of Rights, Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Veterans Bill of Rights, etc. Greenfield At
Large, Are Some of the 'New Rights' the Wrong Stuff?. (CNN television broadcast, June
19, 2001) ("Are these the same kind of rights our forefathers fought and died
for? ... sometimes it seems that every interest group has a proposal to create a
new bill of rights.").
For a discussion of airline passengers' rights initiatives overseas see Jeffrey
Goh, Air Passenger Rights: The Third Way, 8 CONSUMER L.J. 407 (2000) (examining
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The PBOR legislation will not improve airline service under
any circumstances. These legislative efforts to codify passenger
service rights are largely motivated by normative conceptualiza-
tions of good and bad airline service and practices. In the ag-
gregate, the PBOR legislation, coupled with the still-evolving
reality presented by the novel terrorism of September 11, repre-
sents an important point in the history of deregulated commer-
cial airline travel. The PBOR proposals represent an unfulfilled
Congressional appetite to regulate6 airline conduct and rede-
fine the relationship between carrier and passenger.7 To the ex-
tent that they promote government interposition between
carrier and passenger with respect to basic service issues, the
PBOR initiative establishes important, but unwanted and un-
helpful precedent. While substantial commentary exists as to
the economic benefits, weaknesses and imagined consequences
of the deregulated airline system,' this Article examines the ser-
the European Commission's "Airline Passenger Service Commitment" and "Air-
port Voluntary Commitment on Air Passenger Services"); see also Ellchiro Seki-
gawa, Japan Tackles Flight Rights of Mentally Ill Passengers, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECI., July 15, 2002, at 44.
6 Strong impulses to regulate the domestic airline industry have remained con-
stant notwithstanding the social, political, and economic transformations result-
ing from September 11. As Representative Peter DeFazio (D-Or.) notes:
This was an industry that was tremendously mismanaged before
9/11 . . . Remember the big subject before 9/11 was passenger
rights because people felt so abused ... We need to begin to think
about whether we're going to have to regulate this industry again.
NBC NEws' Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 18, 2002).. See also Con-
gress Calls Airline Execs on Carpet, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 7, 2001, at 2 (noting
Senator Ernest Hollings's (D-S.C.) self-characterization as a "born-again
regulator").
7 Zachary Garsek, Comment, Giving Power Back to the Passengers: The Airline Pas-
sengers'Bill of Rights, 66J. AIR L. & COM. 1187, 1190 (2001) (surveying 1999 legis-
lation, reporting related Congressional testimony and suggesting that, if
voluntary airline efforts are "fruitless, the state of customer service in the airline
industry has disintegrated to the point that some government regulation is neces-
sary."); Brent D. Bowen & Dean E. Headley, The Airline Quality Rating 2001, at 7
("Given the complexity of the problem, lack of desire by the airlines to help
themselves and the consumer, and the need to better utilize public resources,
government intervention seems necessary and appropriate.").
8 See, e.g., GEORGE WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S MIXED
LEGACY (Ashgate 2002); KENNETH BUTrON & ROGER STOUGH, AIR TRANSPORT NET-
WORKS (2000); GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE AiRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF DER-
EGULATION (1993); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE
DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE MYTHOLOGY (1992); Laurence E. Gesell & Mar-
tin T. Farris, Airline Deregulation: An Evaluation of Goals and Objectives, 21 TRANSP.
L.J. 105 (1992); Theodore P. Harris, The Disaster of Deregulation, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 87
(1991); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE
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vice-oriented initiative of the PBOR legislation as one negatively
implicating and undermining the efficacy and future of com-
mercial airline deregulation policy. In the course of such exam-
ination, this Article also evaluates the continued vitality of
deregulation principles in light of the severe and increasingly
restrictive air travel environment brought about by the events of
September 11.
Broadly, this Article documents a four-year period during
which the meaning of "passengers' rights" has changed as dra-
matically as its import. The PBOR initiative began as a pro-active
one, arising in a stimulated economic environment wherein ag-
grieved consumers and government officials sought to expand
the range of services for airline passengers as a matter of law.
Now, post-September 11, the term "passengers' rights" connotes
a defensive attitude mindful of, and in some instances receptive
to, a necessary narrowing of airline travelers' liberties in the
name of national security interests. In the end, a central mes-
sage is apparent: passengers' rights is as important an issue as
ever and, more specifically, as a movement, may eventually serve
to undo economic deregulation policy if the airlines do not fully
account for service and security problems in the industry. Part II
sets forth the origins and details the terms of the proposed laws.
Part III examines the issues driving passengers rights legislation
by: (a) analyzing the proposals as a running commentary on the
state of deregulated airline travel; (b) tracing the social and cul-
tural deterioration in the relationships among airlines, their pas-
sengers and the federal government; (c) questioning whether
any set of laws or legislation can resolve identified service
problems better than or as well as market forces; (d) developing
and juxtaposing airline practices, infrastructure realities, and
J. REG. 325 (1990); Andrew R. Goetz & Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airline Deregula-
tion Ten Years After: Something Foul in the Air, 54 J. AIR L. & CoM. 927 (1989);
Melvin A. Brenner, Airline Deregulation - A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16
TRANSt?. L.J. 179 (1988); Alfred E. Kahn, Airline Deregulation - A Mixed Bag, But a
Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANSP. LJ. 229 (1988) [hereinafter Kahn, Airline Der-
egulation]; Thomas G. Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its Effects on Passengers, Capi-
tal and Labor, 29 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1986); Edward A. Morash, Airline Deregulation:
Another Look, 50J. AIR L. & COM. 253 (1985); Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Re-
vised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179
(1981); C. Vincent Olson &John M. Trapani, III, Who Has Benefited from Regula-
tion of the Airline Industry?, 24J.L. & ECoN. 75 (1981); Symposium, The Impact of
Government Regulation on Air Transportation, 9 AKRON L. REV. 629 (1976); Richard
D. Gritta, Profitability and Risk in Air Transport: A Case for Deregulation, 7 TRANSP.
LJ. 197 (1975); WILLIAM A. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS
AND IMPERFECTIONS (The Johns Hopkins Press 1970).
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market and labor dynamics as themes recommending calibrated
change and/or modernization; and (e) discussing the new role
passengers should or must play in today's anxious airways and
airports. Part IV concludes that the events of September 11 and
the resulting and/or contemporaneous economic stall do not,
and should not, mask real infrastructure and service-related is-
sues that must be addressed, with or without the threat of pend-
ing legislation. 9 In that context, the examined service-related
proposals represent nothing more than an ineffective govern-
mental attempt to regulate by shame. While the PBOR legisla-
tion likely will not become law in the short term, U.S. airlines, in
the long term, risk losing the benefits of deregulation if they fail
to improve service and security appreciably, whether they are
blameworthy or not."°
II. PASSENGERS' BILL OF RIGHTS
A. THE IMPETUS AND HISTORIcAL ATTEMPTS
In January 1999, Marti Sousanis, like thousands of post-holi-
day travelers, arrived at a crowded airport ready to go home.
After waiting several hours in multiple lines at Detroit Metropol-
itan Airport, she boarded Northwest Airlines flight 992 to San
Francisco.1" Despite an announcement reporting that the flight
was on time, the airplane sat on the tarmac for a seemingly in-
terminable period. A blizzard covered the Detroit airport with
over a foot of snow and stranded Sousanis's flight and more
than two dozen other airplanes for up to eleven hours. 12 Condi-
tions on the planes became nightmarish as the hours passed.
9 AIR TRANSP. ASS'N, State of the Airline Industry: A Report on Recent Trends for U.S.
Air Carriers 8 (2002) ("The delay problem has temporarily receded since Septem-
ber 11, due to the reduction in flights. However, as airlines return to their pre-
September 11 schedules, the number and duration of flight delays will in-
crease."); see also Al Frank, American Airlines CEO: Don't Forget Old Problems, STAR-
LEDGER (New Jersey), Feb. 20, 2002 ("We will find ourselves headed for gridlock
once again if we don't keep pushing to modernize and expand the capacity of
our nation's aviation system in the air and on the ground.").
10 See infra text accompanying note 48.
i Complaint, Sousanis v. Northwest Airlines et al., No. C-99-2994 (N.D. Ca.
2000). A day earlier, Sousanis boarded flight 992 in Detroit, but that flight was
cancelled following an aborted takeoff. Id. 7; see also Matt Leising, The (Not-So)
Friendly Skies, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 27, 1999, at 4.
12 In January, 2001, Northwest agreed to a settlement, paying $5 million
among 700 class action plaintiffs based on the length of time each person was
delayed. Michael Katz, Airline Peanuts, FORBES, Feb. 19, 2001, at 53 (quoting plain-
tiffs' lead counsel, "We've been working on this for two years and they were on
the plane for 11 hours. That's the nature of our legal system.").
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Food and water ran out and toilets overflowed. Passengers "be-
came physically ill, . . . [and were] exposed to the growing odor
of [a] concentrated number of humans in an enclosed small
space."'' The crew of flight 992 was uncaring. Each time
Sousanis tried to stand to relieve her chronically-pained back,
the flight crew threatened her with arrest and told her to obey
an unrelenting "fasten seatbelt" sign. Horror stories such as this
served as the anecdotal flagship of a legislative fleet of passen-
gers' rights legislation considered by the United States
Congress.
Notwithstanding numerous substantive flaws, the PBOR legis-
lation enjoys broad support. The need to improve airline ser-
vice attracts the attention of government representatives
(irrespective of party affiliation) who, like their constituents,
rely upon commercial airlines. Narratives of terrible airline ser-
vice resonate with representatives who must travel from Wash-
ington, D.C. to their districts.' 4  Federal legislators, as
recognizable passengers on public airplanes, often are drawn
into the cause by irritated co-passengers demanding accounta-
bility and explanations. The PBOR proposals represent a well-
intentioned but impossible and poorly designed effort to resolve
the hostility between carrier and customer.
1. The Origin of Passengers' Rights Proposals
The modern passengers' rights movement revisits and, in
many circumstances, recycles historical efforts and impulses, all
of which have died in the legislative process.' 5 Through prevent-
ative and punitive means, the various proposals share a common
13 Ex Parte Amended Class Action Complaint, Koczara et al. v. Wayne County
et al., No. 99-900422 (MI Cir. Ct. Wayne County 1999), 19.
14 Jayne O'Donnell, Frequent Fliers Airlines Really Must Please: Congress, USA To-
DA', July 31, 2001, at 16B; see also Jonathan D. Salant, Congress Looking to Ease
Passengers'Airline Troubles, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 4, 2001, at 26A (relating that one
U.S. Senator's wife paid $917 for passage from Washington, D.C. to Charleston);
Jon Hilkevitch & John Schmeltzer, Air Travel Getting Worse, U.S. Says, C-. TRIB.,
Feb. 13, 2001, at 1 (noting that Senator John McCain's flight from Phoenix to
Chicago was delayed three hours).
15 The executive branch considered the issue of passengers' rights, too. Press
Release, Vice President Gore and Secretary of Transportation Slater Announce
Airline Passenger Fair Treatment Initiative (Mar. 10, 1999). Indeed, presidential
hopefuls have embraced the notion of passengers' rights. Candidates Offer Differing
Visions, J. COM., Nov. 8, 1988, at IA (discussing Governor Michael Dukakis's (D-




objective to require airlines to better apprise their passengers of
existing, and purportedly new, travel rights.
The earliest proposals were presented in 1987. Such legisla-
tion concerned, among other issues, airline delays, truth-in-ad-
vertising, and flight cancellations.' 6 This early legislation
encouraged easy access to travel-related information and ac-
counted for the inadequate capacity of the national air traffic
system. For example, then-Representative (now current Secre-
tary of the Department of Transportation ("DOT")), Norman Y.
Mineta (D-Cal.), introduced the "Air Passenger Protection Act
of 1987," which directed the DOT Secretary to, among other
things, establish: (1) a twenty-four hour toll-free airline con-
sumer hotline; (2) regulations preventing air carriers from
changing the requirements of a frequent flyer program to the
detriment of program participants without reasonable notice;
and (3) an advisory committee to report to the Secretary and
the Congress about the appropriate capacity level in the air traf-
fic control system. 7 This proposal, along with an identical Sen-
ate version,"8 died in conference but ultimately led to the
current practice whereby the DOT compiles and publishes data
relating to on-time performance and mishandled baggage.
Non-governmental entities also developed passengers' rights
proposals. For example, in 1987, a private group, "Airline Pas-
sengers of America," developed a passengers' bill of rights to
address poor airliner service. It demanded: (1) the deconges-
tion of hubs; (2) the enactment of consumer protection legisla-
tion aimed at increasing information available to passengers; (3)
a government obligation to provide, through the news media,
real-time reports of delays; and (4) the availability of and timely
resolution of DOT complaint forms. 19
Later, in 1989, legislators presented several other intrusive
proposals meant to interpose the federal government between
bottom-line-driven airlines and their passengers. At one end of
the spectrum, Representative Fortney "Pete" Stark (D-Cal.) ar-
ticulated a proposal hardly worthy of federal legislation - an
"Airline Passenger Bill of Rights" requiring airlines, for exam-
16 Cecilia Preble, House Panel Considers Reregulation of Airlines, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., June 15, 1987, at 74 (discussing various passengers' rights
proposals).
17 H.R. 3051, 100th Cong. (1987).
18 Air Passenger Protection Act of 1987, S. 1485, 100th Cong. (1987).
19 J.A. Donoghue, Passenger Group Joins Assault on Poor Service, AiR TRANSP.
WORLD, Oct. 1987, at 28.
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pie, to make available, upon request, a fare not including food
or beverage.2 0 At the other end of the legislative spectrum, and
potentially more significant, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-
Ohio) introduced the "Airline Reregulation Act of 1989" (the
"Reregulation Act") .21 This Reregulation Act would have estab-
lished an independent federal executive agency called the "Avia-
tion Policy Board" that would have been empowered, "[i]n
order to protect the public interest, ... to regulate the air fares
and air routes of United States air carriers. '22 With respect to
consumer rights, the Reregulation Act also would have: (1) obli-
gated the DOT Secretary to issue regulations requiring U.S. air-
lines to disclose on each ticket jacket a statement that the
ticketed passenger could obtain an on-time performance record
of the carrier; (2) required the DOT Secretary to establish a
twenty-four hour toll-free consumer hotline to provide con-
sumer information on air carrier performance records, the
rights of consumers and responsibilities of air carriers, and dis-
pute resolution assistance; and (3) commanded the creation of
regulations prohibiting air carriers from canceling flights on the
basis of any economic reason (unless the carrier provided ade-
quate notice of cancellation and arranged for alternative ser-
vices for passengers) .21 Such affirmative proposals generally
sought to improve passengers' bargaining power with airlines.
Other proposals arose from a need to diminish the inequita-
ble (not to mention inconvenient) consequences airline passen-
gers endured during the 1980s and 1990s as a result of merciless
competition among major airlines in the deregulated market-
place. An extraordinary, accelerated, and disturbing trend to-
ward airline market concentration through consolidation and/
or bankruptcy occurred during that period and motivated Con-
gress to insulate airline passengers from these business realities.
For example, proposals such as the "Airline Bankruptcy Passen-
ger Protection Act of 1989" required several airlines to prepare
and adhere to a plan for providing air transportation to passen-
gers holding a ticket for travel on other airlines, which, subse-
20 H.R. 3528, 101st Cong. § 1708 (1989); see also Passenger Rights, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Nov. 6, 1989, at 15; Rep. Stark Introduces Airline Consumer Protection
Bill, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 27, 1989, at 183.
21 S. 1854, 101st Cong. (1989).
22 Id. § 107.
23 Id. § 201.
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quent to the ticket purchase date, filed for bankruptcy. 24
Likewise, in 1990, Representative Don Ritter (R-Pa.) introduced
the "Airline Passenger Defense Act of 1990," calling for the es-
tablishment of an "Office of Airline Passenger Advocacy" within
the DOT to enforce regulations respecting oversales, smoking,
baggage liability, and carrier-owned computer reservations sys-
tems.25 While marketplace convulsions in the 1980s and 1990s
arguably produced a more economically stable and mature in-
dustry, it also strained passengers' trust of air carriers and per-
petuated the mistaken notion that federal legislation, rather
than market forces, would introduce and maintain sound ser-
vice in the airline industry.
In the aggregate, early passengers' rights proposals intro-
duced the attitude of legislating airline accountability. For ex-
ample, the aforementioned "Airline Passenger Defense Act of
1990" proposed a new section within the Deregulation Act, to be
entitled "Airline Passenger Consumer Protection." That section
would have provided that, with respect to delays, "[t]he on-time
performance of any regularly scheduled flight of an air carrier
may not be 30 percent or less in any consecutive 3-month pe-
riod. 26 Similarly, in 1991, the "Airline Consumer Protection
and Competition Emergency Commission Act of 1991," pro-
posed "an assessment of the adverse condition of the United
States air passenger industry. ' 27 Also introduced was the "Airline
Competition and Passenger Protection Act of 1991" which
would have required certain airlines to submit to the DOT Sec-
retary a monthly report showing the percentage of its passengers
who missed a connection at all of that airline's hub operations
and to provide a list (with a statement of reason(s)) of flights
that were late in arrival, along with a statement of the reasons
for delay. 28 In the 1997-98 Congressional session, legislators in-
troduced other proposals (mimicked by modern legislation), in-
cluding the "Aviation Consumer Right to Know Act of 1998, "29
the "Airline Competition and Lower Fares Act,''O and the "Air-
24 H.R. 1292, 101st Cong. § 2(a) (1989); S. 1858, 101st Cong. (1989) (senate
version). Same-titled bills also were introduced during the 102d Congress in
1991. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
25 H.R. 5453, 101st Cong. (1990).
26 Id. § 1703(a).
27 S. 1998, 102d Cong. (1991).
28 H.R. 2037, 102d Cong. (1991).
29 H.R. 4742, 105th Cong. (1998).
30 H.R. 3160, 105th Cong. (1998).
2002] 943
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line Service Improvement Act of 1997.' 3 1 In the summer of
1998, a private organization, the American Society of Travel
Agents, presented its own "Air Traveler's Bill of Rights" advocat-
ing terms similar to the modern proposals:
* truth in advertised prices, schedules and seat availability;
* equal access to unbiased, comparative travel information and
all fare and service options;
" a comfortable seat, reasonable space for carry-on luggage,
healthful meals, and clean sanitary facilities, regardless of class
of service;
" timely and courteous assistance in making connections;
* use of all, part or none of the segment of any ticket purchased;
" timely, complete and truthful information and courteous assis-
tance regarding delays, cancellations, and equipment changes;
" timely and courteous assistance for disabled and unaccompa-
nied children;
* appropriate in-flight medical emergency assistance; and
* access to the courts and state consumer laws to resolve disputes
with airlines.3
Fundamentally, these public and private proposals sought to
improve the content and frequency of communication between
airline passengers and carriers, such as those passengers might
claim when using other forms of transportation.33 From a pas-
senger service perspective, all of these proposals implicated the
viability of an economically deregulated airline industry and
questioned whether passenger service would improve if and only
31 H.R. 2748, 105th Cong. (1998).
32 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TRAVEL AGENTS, AIR TRAVELER'S BILL OF RIGHTS, at
http://www.astanet.com/travel/trav-rights.asp (last visited August 1, 2002).
33 Consider:
As a [New York] taxi rider, you have the right to (1) direct the
destination and route used; (2) travel to any destination in the five
boroughs of the City of New York; (3) a courteous, English-speak-
ing driver who knows the streets of Manhattan and the way to major
destinations in other boroughs; (4) a driver who knows and obeys
all traffic laws; (5) air-conditioning on demand; (6) a radio-free (si-
lent) trip; (7) smoke and incense-free air; (8) a clean passenger
seat area; (9) a clean trunk; (10) a driver who uses the horn only
when necessary to warn of danger; and (11) refuse to tip, if the
above are not complied with.
NEW YORK CrrY TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, TAXICAB RIDER'S BILL OF RIGHTS, at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/rights.html (last visited August 1, 2002); see
also Raphael Lewis, T Puts Punctuality to the Test with Free-Ride Promise, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2001, at Al (discussing "MBTA Rider's Bill of Rights" governing
travel on city trolleys, buses, ferries, and commuter trains).
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if the airlines lost the benefits of economic deregulation and
were re-regulated or otherwise supervised by the government.
2. Service, Competition, and Preemption
The specific and untenable goals of the modern passengers'
rights initiative are to improve passenger service and calibrate
marketplace competition. To obtain these goals, the PBOR leg-
islation concentrates primarily on four specific issues: (1) delays;
(2) overbooking; (3) access to and refund of fares; and (4) mar-
ket stability. 4 Collectively, these issues identify a core grievance
leveled against commercial airlines - a purposefully ineffective
or nonexistent ability to communicate truthfully. 5 In other
words, the airlines lie and escape accountability by virtue of
their indispensability to travelers. Passengers have no option
but to endure weather-related delays, but they have lost patience
for situations created or aggravated by airlines offering false or
no explanations, such as when a passenger holding a confirmed
ticket is bumped from an overbooked flight. 6 While weather
accounts for more than two-thirds of flight delays nationally,37 it
"does not cause mishandled baggage, and congestion does not
34 The considered proposals also addressed retrieval of lost baggage, redemp-
tion' of frequent flyer miles, and provision of in-flight emergency services. With
respect to the legal implications of airlines providing in-flight emergency services
see Julie A. Buffington, Comment, Airlines, Defibrillators, and Enhanced Medical
Kits: Filing a Void or Creating a Duty?, 64J. AIR L. & COM. 497 (1999).
35 Statement by U.S. Senator Ron Wyden on the Airline Passengers Fairness
Act, at http://www.senate.gov/~wyden/feature/airlinel.htm ("We're not talking
about a federal mandate for fluffier pillows or a Constitutional right to a bigger
bag of peanuts -just the right to basic information and the ability to make deci-
sions for yourself.") (last visited August 1, 2002).
36 Don Phillips, 21 Days, 18 Flights: A Journey of Discovery Finds Miles of Discontent
in the Coach Cabin, WASH. PosT,June 13, 1999, at HO [hereinafter Discontent in the
Coach Cabin] (observing "that passengers do not trust airlines. In fact, many fre-
quent fliers assume the airline is lying to them, no matter what an airline em-
ployee says").
37 In 2000, weather caused approximately seventy percent of all airline delays,
whereas traffic contributed fourteen percent. Yet, one industry observer notes:
[e]ven clear skies and functioning airports can cause fits. One day,
Newark's [air traffic controllers'] request for a five-to-ten minute
hold on 15 arrivals from the west mushroomed into an airborne
gridlock. This rolling-snowball-turned-avalanche began with air-
planes holding in Cleveland Center's airspace. To ease the strain,
over-worked Cleveland controllers turned to Chicago and Indian-
apolis Centers, asking them to also hold Newark-bound flights.
Now some 70 airplanes were affected. Then Chicago Center asked
Minneapolis Center to hold Newark flights. All of these orbiting
airplanes forced controllers to re-route flights headed to or from
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prohibit giving timely information on delays," as Senator John
McCain (R-Ariz.), former Chairman of the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee, noted." The deregu-
lated airlines historically have had few legal, as opposed to busi-
ness, incentives to offer anything but a deaf ear.3 9
The existing law has exacerbated the communication prob-
lem between carrier and passenger and fueled passenger and
government outrage. Unlike other industries, airlines are im-
mune from state regulations and consumer laws.4 ' The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 ("Deregulation Act"), eliminated the
federal government's control over airfares and routes and au-
thorized the DOT to oversee and enforce air travel consumer
protection requirements.4' The Deregulation Act contains a
preemption clause mandating: "[N]o state . . . shall enact or
enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provi-
sion ... relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier. '42
Congress designed this preemption clause to assure uniformity
under the Deregulation Act and to effectuate federal, economic
deregulation policies in an environment insulated from state
regulation.43 The preemption clause and its underlying policy
thus confront allegedly aggrieved airline passengers with signifi-
cant legal obstacles both in tort44 and contract suits. A savings
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Philadelphia. Within a mere 20 min-
utes some 250 airplanes were facing delays of one sort or another.
Stan Solomon, 'D' is for Delay, AIRWAYS, July 2001, at 21.
38 Paul Mann, Passenger Rights Law Gains Steam on Hill, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Feb. 19, 2001, at 43.
39 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
4o 49 U.S.C. §§ 41712-13 (2001). See Paul Mann, Passenger Rights Movement Ex-
pected to Bounce Back, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 25, 1999, at 54, 58 (quot-
ing Oregon Senator Ron Wyden, "Movie theatres can't cancel a show if only a few
people show up for the movie, but airlines can cancel flights when they deter-
mine they don't have enough passengers . . . That's patently unfair.").
41 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
42 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (revised without substantive change by 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b) (4) (A) (1994)). See generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction
and Application of § 105 Airline Deregulation Act (49 U.S. C.A. § 41713), Pertaining to
Preemption of Authority Over Prices, Routes, and Services, 149 A.L.R. FED. 299 (1998).
43 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992) (Scalia,
J.). But see H.R. 711, 107th Cong. (2001) (clarifying that state attorney generals
"may enforce State consumer protection laws with respect to air transportation
and the advertisement and sale of air transportation").
44 See, e.g., Christopher S. Morin, Flying the Not-So-Friendly Skies: Charas v. TWA's
Definition of "Service" Under the ADA's Preemption Clause Exposes Airlines to Tort Liabil-
ity, 65J. AIR L. & COM. 497 (2000); see also John T. Houchin, Harris v. American
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clause that purportedly sustains common law and statutory rem-
edies does not support claims alleging deceptive fare advertise-
ments, for example.45  However, the contemporary legal
framework has shifted in step with the popular concern about a
cultural and behavioral decline in commercial air travel. Specifi-
cally, in 1995, the United States Supreme Court resolved, in
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, that preemption under the Der-
egulation Act does not preclude state breach of contract claims
against airlines.46 On at least this basis, passengers' rights propo-
nents mistakenly argue that such proposals, once codified as
law, will, as enforceable parts of each airline's contract of car-
riage, improve airline passenger service and/or establish conse-
quences for service deficiencies. 47 Aside from security-related
efforts in the wake of September 11, such a strategy represents a
significant governmental intrusion into the service practices and
conduct of airlines that, in any event, will not guarantee wanted
change in airliner service.
B. THE INITIAL EFFORT (1999-2000)
The PBOR proposals represent the product of unreflective,
fed-up, opportunistic, and emotionally-charged legislators exer-
cising their significant law-making powers in order to force
changes more appropriately produced, if at all, by the free mar-
ket. Importantly, as the overview in this section shows, the air-
lines' actual or alleged failure to rectify service-related issues
jeopardizes the life of policies favoring economic
deregulation.4"
Airlines: Flying Through the Turbulence of Federal Preemption and the Airline Deregula-
tion Act, 51 U. MiAMi L. REV. 955 (1997).
.5 49 U.S.C. § 1106 (now found at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994)). Laynie Giles,
Note, Interpreting the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: Federal Preemption Over State
Deceptive Advertising Laws, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 87 (1994); Eric W. Maclure, Note,
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: Federal Preemption Provision Clips States' Wings
on Regulation of Air Fare Advertising, 71 N.C. L. REV. 905 (1993).
46 513 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.) (considering a state breach of
contract claim arising from retroactive modification of frequent flyer benefits
and concluding: "We do not read the ADA's preemption clause, however, to shel-
ter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seek-
ing recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed
undertakings."). See generally Sue Haverkos, Casenote, Crash and Burn - The Air-
lines' Preemption Defense Goes Down in Flames: American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S.
Ct. 817 (1995), 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1141 (1996).
47 14 C.F.R. § 253 (2001).
48 Michele McDonald, Trouble on the Hill; Congress Considers Possible Airline Regu-
lations, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, June 1, 2001, at 95 (noting that some industry observ-
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In early February, 1999, many members of Congress, aggra-
vated by the January delays in Detroit (discussed in Part II.A.,
supra) introduced the PBOR legislation, of which only one pro-
posal expressly provided for notice to passengers of any such
rights.49 Several proposals responded directly to the January
1999 delays. One plan guaranteed passengers a complete re-
fund and right to exit an airplane that did not take off within
two hours of the scheduled departure time or park within two
hours of landing.5" An alternative proposal required airlines to
allow passengers to exit an airplane that remained at its gate
"more than 1 hour past its scheduled departure time."51 A third
proposal solicited regulations ensuring "access to necessary ser-
vices and conditions, including food, water, restroom facilities,
and emergency medical services for all passengers. ' 52 Other
proposals sought to improve, or provide in the first place, legal
standards of communication between airlines and passengers.
Several PBOR proposals would produce potentially dangerous
consequences insofar as they promote timely air travel at the ex-
pense of passenger safety. Multiple proposals demanded truth-
in-scheduling and required airlines to notify passengers of de-
lays, diversions or cancellations.53 While some simply required
airlines to make an announcement, others were more punitive,
imposing financial penalties on an airline for anything less than
ers question "whether the industry isn't secretly hoping for reregulation" by
resisting passengers' rights legislation: "It was, after all, the airlines themselves
who invited the government to impose regulation in order to save them from
competition, and only United among the then trunk carriers supported deregula-
tion in 1978."). See discussion infra Part III.A, generally, and text accompanying
note 117, specifically.
49 Passenger Entitlement and Competition Enhancement Act of 1999, H.R.
780, 106th Cong. (1999).
50 Airline Deregulation and Disclosure Act of 1999, S. 603, 106th Cong.
(1999).
51 Omnibus Airline Passenger Fair Treatment Act of 1999, H.R. 2200, 106th
Cong. § 4(b) (2) (1999); Air Travelers Fair Treatment Act of 2000, S. 2891, 106th
Cong. (1999) (same); see Move Toward Re-Regulation of Aviation Industry Gains Mo-
mentum, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Feb. 2, 2001 (summarizing bill).
52 Passenger Entitlement and Competition Enhancement Act of 1999, H.R.
780, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring airlines to submit an "emergency plan" to the
DOT); Airline Deregulation and Disclosure Act of 1999, S. 603, 106th Cong.
(1999).
53 See, e.g., Airline Competition and Passenger Protection Act of 1991, H.R.
2037, 102d Cong. § 1703(b) (1991) (obligating an airline to notify ticketed pas-
sengers before boarding of known delays in excess of one hour of (a) the approx-
imate length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; and (c) the opportunity
for a refund for the purchase price of the ticket).
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an accurate and truthful broadcast.54 Representative Bud
Shuster (R-Pa.), 55 for instance, proposed a bill that imposed fi-
nancial liability on airlines for "an excessive departure or arrival
delay, ' 56 thereby offering airlines the perverse incentive to try to
fly on-time even if to do so wagers passenger safety. Under this
far-fetched scheme, except for delays caused by air traffic con-
trol, airlines would be required to pay twice the value of a ticket
price for delays between two and three hours.57 Proposals such
as this not only mandate ridiculous operational requirements of
airlines, but also inject government regulation into purely free
market matters.
The PBOR proposals threaten the policy underpinnings of
the Deregulation Act by targeting airline business practices in
the form of communication regarding fares, refunds and ticket
use. Multiple proposals shared a common goal to help passen-
54 Compare Airline Passenger Fairness Act, S. 383, 106th Cong. (1999) (requir-
ing airlines to provide "reasonable prior notice" of delay of any scheduled flight
(except with respect to matters of national security) and to provide an accurate
and truthful reason as to each and any delay, diversion or cancellation) with Avia-
tion Consumer Right to Know Act of 1999, H.R. 908, 106th Cong. (1999) (requir-
ing an announcement about the expected length of the delay) and Omnibus
Airline Passenger Fair Treatment Act of 1999, H.R. 2200, 106th Cong. (1999)
(imposing duty to provide "accurate explanation" on both domestic and foreign
carriers) and Passenger Entitlement and Competition Enhancement Act of 1999,
H.R. 780, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring "sufficient and accurate notice, based
on information reasonably available to the carrier").
55 Jim Abrams, Unfriendly Skies, LAS VEGAS Rrv.-J., Mar. 11, 1999, at 1D (quoting
the Congressman, "We have struck a raw nerve.").
56 Airline Passenger Bill of Rights, H.R. 700, 106th Cong. (1999). The propo-
sal defines "excessive departure or arrival delay" as a period of time in excess of 2
hours -
(A) in the case of departure, beginning when the door of an air-
craft is closed at an airport and ending when the aircraft takes off
from the airport or when the door of the aircraft is open for de-
planing of passengers at the airport; and
(B) in the case of arrival delay, beginning upon touchdown of an
aircraft at an airport and ending when the door of the aircraft is
open for deplaning of passengers at the airport.
Id. § 2. The penalty for a delay between two and three hours would be 200 per-
cent of the ticket purchase price, plus another 100 percent for each additional
hour (or portion thereof) beyond a three hour delay. Id; see also Biztravel.com,
Your Hight Arrives On Time or We Pay You Back, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2000, at A9
(advertising guaranty of $100 refund if flight arrives thirty minutes late, $200 if
one hour late, and the full ticket price if two hours late or cancelled).
57 Airline Passenger Bill of Rights, H.R. 700, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring
airlines to refund passengers "economically cancelled" even if they ultimately are
provided transportation); Passenger Entitlement and Competition Enhancement
Act of 1999, H.R. 780, 106th Cong. (1999).
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gers understand the various sources of published fares and re-
lated conditions, and to ensure full access to all offered fares
regardless of the medium used, e.g., Internet or paper advertise-
ment.58 The proposals also sought to regulate airline service op-
tions by safeguarding a clever consumer practice of purchasing
so-called "hidden tickets." For example, a ticket for travel from
point A (a hub airport) through B and finally to C often is
cheaper than a ticket from A to B. Savvy passengers purchase
the less expensive ticket and deplane at B. Currently, airlines
prohibit this practice and assess an additional charge on passen-
gers and ticket agents who sold the ticket.59 Yet, some legislation
directed airlines to allow such practice, including one bill that
required airlines to refund the full price of an unused ticket,
upon request made within forty-eight hours after purchase.60
The initial PBOR legislation also purported to add law to ar-
eas already regulated. Specifically, the proposals sought to pre-
vent overbooking and flight cancellation for business purposes.
In this regard, Senator Shuster's proposal established efforts to
disclose and penalize patterns of airlines engaging in "economic
cancellations," that is, cancellations "for reasons other than
safety."61 Senators Ron Wyden (D-Or.) and McCain, meanwhile,
focused upon habitual airline overbooking and the consequent
bumping of ticketed passengers.6 2 The Wyden-McCain proposal
58 Airline Passenger Fairness Act, S. 383, 106th Cong. (1999); Aviation Con-
sumer Right to Know Act of 1999, H.R. 908, 106th Cong. (1999); Omnibus Air-
line Passenger Fair Treatment Act of 1999, H.R. 2200, 106th Cong. (1999);
Airline Deregulation and Disclosure Act of 1999, S. 603, 106th Cong. (1999).
59 Air Travelers Fair Treatment Act of 2000, S. 200, 106th Cong. (2000); Omni-
bus Airline Passenger Fair Treatment Act of 1999, H.R. 2200, 106th Cong.
(1999); Aviation Consumer Right to Know Act of 1999, H.R. 908, 106th Cong.
(1999); Airline Deregulation and Disclosure Act of 1999, S. 603, 106th Cong.
(1999). See SOUTHWEST AIRLINES Co., CUSTOMER SERVICE COMMITMENT 5 (2001)
("'Hidden city' and 'back to back' reservations and tickets are authorized for
travel on Southwest Airlines."). See also Congressional Directive Could Cost Airlines
Billions, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1 (quoting ATA representative, "This
is just like price switching at a store. It is considered theft when you take the
price off a cheap, little television and put it on a nice big screen. There is no
difference here.").
60 Airline Passenger Fairness Act, S. 383, 106th Cong. (1999).
61 Airline Passenger Bill of Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 700, 106th Cong. (1999);
Airline Deregulation and Disclosure Act of 1999, S. 603, 106th Cong. (1999)
(identical Senate version).
62 While not legally prohibited from overbooking flights, airlines must estab-
lish boarding priority rules and a sequence in which confirmed passengers will be
bumped if an insufficient number of volunteers come forward. 14 C.F.R.
§ 250.3(a) (2001).
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required airlines to inform passengers, upon request, whether a
flight was oversold." Another plan required airlines to provide
an involuntarily "bumped" passenger with alternative transporta-
tion to the final destination within two hours of the originally
scheduled arrival time or else give a refund or voucher for fu-
ture travel.64
Last, the proposed legislation sought to empower passengers
by regulating the business environment encountered by new air-
lines, to patrol market competition, and to establish regulatory
reactions to further industry consolidation. One bill, the "Air-
line Competition and Fairness Act of 1999, '' 65 followed earlier-
proposed legislation by focusing on the unfair competitive prac-
tice of "low cost carrier" tactics or "predatory pricing" whereby a
dominant air carrier" matches the fares of a new entrant, low-
cost airline and increases its own capacity of flights to match the
prices and routes offered by the new entrant. 67 The unmistaka-
ble intent of this tactic is to drive new entrants out of a particu-
lar market and then to return fares and service to prior levels.68
63 Airline Passenger Fairness Act, S. 383, 106th Cong. (1999).
64 Passenger Entitlement and Competition Enhancement Act of 1999, H.R.
780, 106th Cong. (1999); 14 C.F.R. § 250.5(a) (2001) (same requirement).
65 H.R. 1678, 106th Cong. (1999).
66 Airline Competition Preservation Act of 2000, H.R. 4978, 106th Cong.
§ 2(e) (1) (2000) (defining "dominant air carrier" as an airline that, "with respect
to a hub airport ... accounts for more than 50 percent of the total annual board-
ings at [an] airport in the preceding 2-year period or a shorter period.").
67 Airline Predatory Pricing Prevention Act of 1993, S. 770, 103d Cong.
§ 2(c) (4) (1993). This act offered two indicators of predatory pricing:
(A) The pricing by the air carrier for air transportation in the city-
pair market at issue is below the direct operating costs of the air
carrier in providing such transportation.
(B) Decreases in the pricing by the air carrier for such air transpor-
tation are occurring when market forces have led to sustained
downward development of air fares deviating significantly from or-
dinary seasonal pricing movements and resulting in widespread
losses among all air carriers for providing such air transportation.
Id.; see generally, Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal
Policy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000); Russell A. Klingaman, Predatory Pricing and Other
Exclusionary Conduct in the Airline Industry: Is Antitrust Law the Solution?, 4 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 281 (1992);Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition
of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981).
68 Predatory tactics are difficult to distinguish from allowable competition.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
263, 266-67 (1981) ("A plaintiff charging predation will classify a reduction in
price, an expansion in output, the building of a new plant, and so on as proof of
the defendant's villainy. Unless we have some powerful tools to separate preda-
tion from its cousin, hard competition, any legal inquiry is apt to lead to more
harm than good."); see also Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing
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In other words, "the major carriers [respond to new market en-
trants] with strategies of price reductions and capacity increases
designed not to maximize their own profits but rather to deprive
the new entrants of vital traffic and revenues."69 The proposed
bill would require the dominant air carrier to maintain its low-
ered fares and increased capacity for two years. In addition to
prohibiting and safeguarding against these predatory pricing
tactics, other proposals, including the "Airline Competition
Preservation Act of 2000," focused on the remarkable consolida-
tion in the airline industry. 70 A related proposal, the "Airline
Merger Moratorium Act," boldly called for a one-year hiatus on
all mergers while the issue of market consolidation was stud-
ied.v' In the end, however, the airlines met all of this legislation
with steadfast and coordinated resistance.72
C. THE AIRLINES' RESPONSE AND COMMITMENT
The airlines doggedly resisted passage of the legislation,
trumpeting the virtues of self-regulation over re-regulation and
and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 698
(1975). Yet, such tactics conceivably are employed in the airline industry because
there is sufficient market power in the airline industry, as shown by
the persistence of hub premiums at many airports, to allow recoup-
ment of losses incurred in driving a competitor from a market...
[notwithstanding] that the antitrust laws, as they have been applied
in other industries, may not be sufficient to identify some types of
predatory practices in the airline industry.
Clinton V. Oster & John S. Strong, Predatory Practices in the U.S. Airline Industry,
Jan. 15, 2001, at 3, at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/domestic-competition/
predpractices.pdf.
To date, on appeal, the Department of justice (the "DOJ") is pursuing Ameri-
can Airlines's parent entity for allegedly using predatory tactics to drive out low-
cost carriers such as Vanguard, Western Pacific, and Sunjet from its Dallas, Texas
hub. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001); see also
Keith L. Alexander, American Airlines Ruling Appealed, WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 2002,
at E08 (characterizing the DOJ's appeal as surprising); Mark T. Clouatre, The
Legacy of Continental Airlines v. American Airlines: A Re-Evaluation of Predatory
Pricing Theory in the Airline Industry, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 869 (1995).
69 DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y, Statement of the Department of Transpor-
tation's Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transporta-
tion Industry, Docket No. OST-98-3713 (Apr. 6, 1998), available at http://
ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/domav/frpolicy.pdf.
70 H.R. 4978, 106th Cong. (2000); see Paul Mann, Reregulation Flits Around Con-
gress, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 5, 2001, at 46.
71 S. 578, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 761, 107th Cong. (2001)
72 Janet L. Fix, Members of Congress Hope to Stop Future Airline Industry Mergers,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1; Airline Merger Moratorium Act, S. 578,
107th Cong. (2001).
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taking carefully-crafted public actions intended to demonstrate
that the proposals were unnecessary and overbroad. 73 The air-
lines collectively rejected the proposals and spent approximately
three million dollars in opposition lobbying.74 They contended
that the proposals represented re-regulation of commercial air
transportation. They also argued that government meddling in
industry affairs would accelerate the airline industry down the
metaphorical slippery slope into full-fledged regulation.75 Even
airline employees apparently opposed the legislation through,
for instance, letter writing campaigns. 76 Through their trade as-
sociation, the Air Transport Association ("ATA"), the airlines as-
saulted passengers' rights legislation as a distraction from the
purported real problems facing air travel - antiquated technol-
ogy and inadequate airport and runway capacity.77 Notwith-
standing these arguments, the airlines made certain promises to
improve their own behavior.78
On June 17, 1999, the ATA announced a collaborative ap-
proach whereby the major U.S. airlines agreed with Congress to
enter into an "Airline Customer Service Commitment" ("Com-
mitment") and to develop a "Customer First" plan. 9 In return,
73 Don Phillips, Passenger-Rights Proposal Gets Stuck on the Runway, WASH. POST,
June 11, 1999, at E04.
74 Michael Grunwald, As 'Soft Money' Flew In, A McCain Crusade Faded, Airlines
Thwarted Passenger Rights Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1999, at A01 (quoting Senator
McCain, "Big people have access to my office that ordinary Americans don't have.
That's one reason we need reform."); Left at the Gate: How the Airlines Beat Back
Congress on Passenger Rights, at http://www.commoncause.org/publications/
oct99/airline/ (suggesting Congressional timidity in light of airline lobbying
"[b]ecause when it comes to influencing Congress with campaign cash, the air-
lines are always on time") (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
75 Del Jones, Southwest CEO Tops This Year, USA TODAY, July 12, 1999, at 5B
(quoting Herbert D. Kelleher, "When I started, only 15% of adults over 21 had
ever flown on a single commercial flight. Today, [85%] of all adults over 21 have
flown at least one commercial flight. If you re-regulate, then you're making a
societal judgment that too many people are flying.").
76 Continental Airline Employees Oppose Passenger Bill of Rights Plans, Hous.
CHRON., May 8, 1999, at 1; News Release, Continental Airlines Employees Rally
Against "So-Called" Passenger Bill of Rights, at http://continental.com/press/
press_1999-05-07-01.asp (May 7, 1999).
77 See discussion infra Part III.D.1.
78 Keith L. Alexander, Passenger Rights Expanded; Airlines' Vow is Effort to Head
Off New Law, WASH. POST, June 8, 2001, at E01.
79 Laura Goldberg, Airlines Detail How They Will Improve Customer Service, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 16, 1999, at 2; see also Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 224, 114 Stat. 61, 103-04
(2001). Toward the end of enhancing quality of passenger services, the Euro-
pean community similarly transcended legislative intervention and market regu-
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Congress backed away from its efforts to convert passengers'
rights bills into law."' Participating airlines committed to volun-
tarily develop, by December 15, 1999, their own "Customer Ser-
vice Plan" modeled around twelve points:
" offer the lowest fare available;
" notify customers of known delays, cancellations, and
diversions;
* deliver baggage on time;
• support an increase in the baggage liability limit;
* allow reservations to be held or canceled;
" provide prompt ticket refunds;
" properly accommodate disabled and special-need passengers;
* meet customers' essential needs during long on-aircraft delays;
* handle "bumped" passengers with fairness and consistency;
* disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer
rules, and aircraft configuration;
* ensure good customer service from code-share partners; and
" be more responsive to customer complaints.8 1
However, the DOT Inspector General noted that:
the Commitment does not directly address underlying reasons
for customer dissatisfaction, such as extensive flight delays, bag-
gage not showing up on arrival, long check-in lines, and high
fares in certain markets . . . [U]ntil these areas are effectively
addressed by the Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration
["FAA"], and others, there will continue to be discontent among
air travelers . 2
The airlines implemented some improvements. The entire
industry satisfied one of the twelve points by agreeing to in-
lation in favor of promoting voluntary actions by airlines and airports. Goh, supra
note 5, at 409 n.6 (discussing a "Third Way" or "a compromise of long-standing
traditions and practices (in [the case of aviation regulatory reform], between
State regulation and a free-market system) to procure a modernised social de-
mocracy committed to socialIjustice by employing sufficiently flexible and innova-
tive means to achieve the goals of a modern social democracy.").
80 Terence Samuel, No, Really, Thank Congress for the Airlines' Pledge to Passengers,
ST. Louis PosTr-DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1999, at A14 (criticizing Congress).
Sl Jim Landers, Airline Industry Unveils Customer Service Pledge, DALLAS MORNING
NEws,June 18, 1999, at IA. OnJune 7, 2001, the ATA airlines incorporated these
points into their respective contracts of carriage. The fourteen ATA-member air-
lines joining in the Commitment were: Alaska, Aloha, American, American Trans
Air, America West Airlines, Continental, Delta, Hawaiian, Midwest Express,
Northwest, Southwest, TWA, United, and US Airways. See discussion infra Part
III.C.
82 Air Carier Flight Delays and Customer Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Tranp. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 5 (2000) (statement of Ken-
neth M. Mead, Inspector General, United States Department of Transportation).
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crease carrier liability for lost baggage from $1,250 to $2,500.83
Following that, each airline separately attempted to communi-
cate more effectively with its consumers. As a starting point, the
airlines and the ATA exhibited their plans on the Internet. 4
Some carriers created notification systems capable of contacting
passengers by phone, computer, or pager to advise of flight
changes.85 To deal with delays, one airline purchased and used
mobile stairs to deplane delayed passengers and mobile ticket
counters to manage crowded lines.86 Other airlines reported on
their websites the on-time percentage of scheduled flights. Fi-
nally, several airlines publicized their well-received efforts to re-
move seats from their airplanes in order to expand leg-room.87
Though innovative and responsive in some ways, the airlines'
collective and individual plans were discounted as "legalistic
gobbledygook which do nothing to protect passengers' 88 and re-
flect only "vague promises to enforce policies already in place."8 9
Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.) further dismissed the air-
lines' plans, stating, "[v]oluntary commitments are only that -
83 14 C.F.R. § 254.4 (2001). This law originally was proposed as part of the
Airline Passenger Defense Act of 1990, supra note 25.
84 E.g., AIR TRANSP. ASS'N, Customers First, at http://www.customers-first.org/in-
dex-a.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
85 Bryon Okada, Electronic Services Offer Information About Flights, FORT WORTH-
STAR TELEGRAM, Feb. 14, 2001, at 1.
86 Brad Dorfman, Programs Get Under Way to Make the Skies Friendlier, CHI. TIMES
TRIB., Dec. 26, 1999, at 7.
87 See, e.g., John Schmeltzer, More Room with a View, American Creating More Seat
Space, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 2000, at 1 (discussing the "More Room in Coach" cam-
paign). In contrast, Southwest Airlines requires obese passengers to buy two tick-
ets instead of one. Judd Slivka & Kelly Ettenborough, Southwest Policy for Obese
Criticized, ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 20, 2002. See also Jane Wooldridge, The Real
Skinny: Only Pygmies Fit, MIAMI HERALD, July 21, 2002, at 1J. One commentator
notes that such a policy aggravates the relationship between passenger and
carrier:
Wonderful. Already we're wanded and probed and occasionally
disrobed at airports as part of the post-9/11 security measures.
Now we'll be gauged for size by airline employees. * * * The sad-
dest part about all this is that airlines could easily adjust to suit con-
sumer needs if they weren't so greedy.
Harry Shattuck, Is Greed Behind Pinch on Big Folk?, Miami Herald, July 21,
2002, at 1J.
88 Julia Malone, Airlines Thwarted Passenger-Rights Legislation, Group Says, PLAIN
DEALER, Oct. 10, 1999, at 25A (quoting Sen. Ron Wyden).
89 Richard Williamson, Airlines' Plans "Not Passing Laugh-ability Test," DENVER
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 16, 1999, at 2B; Robin Washington, Airlines'Public
Relations Bids Don't Fly with Critics, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 18, 1999, at 24.
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promises to do better."90 Nevertheless, Congress afforded the
airlines approximately one year to voluntarily effectuate the
Commitment, during which the DOT was legally charged with
monitoring and reporting these efforts. 9' As it turned out, the
year only fueled the passengers' rights initiative. 92
D. THE FINAL DOT REPORT AND 2001
On February 12, 2001, Kenneth M. Mead, the DOT Inspector
General, issued the long-anticipated "Final Report on Airline
Customer Service" ("Final Report")." The Final Report stated
that "[o]verall, we found the airlines were making progress...
[but] we find the airlines' commitment does not directly ad-
dress the most deep-seated, underlying cause of customer dissat-
isfaction - flight delays and cancellations, and what the Airlines
plan to do about them in the areas under their control."94 This
language and the Final Report, generally, energized Congress to
act with greater resolve with respect to enforceable passengers'
rights legislation, activating another round of proposals and
stimulating popular debate concerning the troubled state of air-
line travel.95 The day after the Final Report published, Senator
McCain introduced the "Airline Customer Service Improvement
90 James Pilcher, Report: Airlines Broke Promises, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 13,
2001, at A01.
1) Wendell H. Ford Aviation and Reform Act for the 21st Century, supra note 79, at
§ 224, 114 Stat. 61,103.
92 Bowen & Headley, supra note 7, at "Observations About the Industry" ("Even
with a promise to do better, industry performance quality ... declined in 2000.
With Congress again considering the passage of an Airline Passengers' Bill of
Rights it seems that the airline industry is its own worst enemy.").
93 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT No. AV-2001-
020, FINAL REPORT ON AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE COMMITMENT (2001), available
at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/issues/service.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FINAL REPORT].
A Id. at 5.
95 See, e.g., Alexandra Marks, Will a 'Passenger Bill of Rights' Really Work?, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2001, at 3; Adam Bryant, 7 Ways to Fix Air Travel,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 2001, at 38 (offering the following plans to alleviate air-traffic
and airline service woes: (1) construct more runways at existing airports; (2) use
an auction to set the rates for landing fees at major airports; (3) improve cus-
tomer service, i.e., "customers before cargo;" (4) improve air traffic navigation
with modern technology such as Global Positioning Satellite; (5) create an inde-
pendent, nonprofit corporation to operate air traffic control in place of the FAA;
(6) "stop the merger madness;" and (7) encourage passengers to choose a carrier
based on quality of service not just fare or frequent flyer accounts); Paul Mann,
Congress Bearish on Big Carriers, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 12, 2001, at 66;
DOT Report on Airline Service Hits a Congressional Nerve, CONG. DAILY, Feb. 13, 2001
(quoting Senator Wyden: "You don't need more money to start telling people the
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Act."'9 6 Many other plans followed, each of which restated
themes presented in the 1999 and 2000 proposals: communica-
tion and ticket use;9 7 fair treatment;98 competition;99 conges-
tion;100 and maintenance of market status quo. 10 1 Unlike the
initial proposals, however, the bills proposed in 2001 were more
forceful insofar as they required the airlines to incorporate the
service plans into their respective contracts of carriage. Though
eventually making some concessions by agreeing to seventeen
additional customer-service points, 2 the airlines continued to
truth."); Chris Woodyard, Airlines Voluntary Steps Fall Short with Fliers: Sky-High
Gripes Bring New Call for Passenger Bill of Rights, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2001, at 14B.
96 S. 319, 107th Cong. (2001).
97 Consumer-Friendly Airline Ticket Transfer Act, H.R. 1074, 107th Cong.
(2001); Airline Customer Notification Act, H.R. 571, 107th Cong. (2001); Airline
Customer Service Improvement Act, S. 319, 107th Cong. (2001); Aviation Con-
sumer Right to Know Act of 2001, S. 332, 107th Cong. (2001).
98 Fair Treatment of Airline Passengers Act, S. 483, 107th Cong. (2001); Air-
line Passenger Fair Treatment Act of 2001, H.R. 384, 107th Cong. (2001); Air
Travelers Fair Treatment Act of 2001, H.R. 200, 107th Cong. (2001).
99 Airline Competition and Passenger Rights Act of 2001, H.R. 907, 107th
Cong. (2001); Aviation Competition Restoration Act, S. 415, 107th Cong. (2001);
Airline Competition Preservation Act of 2001, S. 199, 107th Cong. (2001); Airline
Competition and Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 204, 107th Cong. (2001); Airline
Competition Preservation Act of 2001, H.R. 142, 107th Cong. (2001).
100 Aviation Delay Prevention Act, S. 633, 107th Cong. (2001); Airport Conges-
tion Relief Act of 2001, H.R. 757, 107th Cong. (2001).
101 Airline Merger Moratorium Act, S. 578, 107th Cong. (2001); Airline Merger
Moratorium Act, H.R. 761, 107th Cong. (2001).
102 The additional points are: (1) incorporate original twelve customer service
commitments into each airline's respective contract of carriage; (2) establish in-
ternal performance measurement systems; (3) cooperate with DOT/Inspector
General audit; (4) set realistic targets for reducing chronically delayed/cancelled
flights; (5) make on-time performance data accessible to customers (on website,
Bureau of Transportation Statistics link, or through 800 number); (6) develop
system to track baggage; (7) establish toll-free number (or local number) for
mishandled baggage information; (8) petition for rulemaking to increase denied
involuntary boarding compensation; (9) petition DOT to change the calculation
and reporting of the rate of mishandled baggage by air carriers to take into ac-
count passengers who do not check luggage; (10) establish airline/airport/FAA
task force to recommend ways to coordinate efforts to help passengers who are
required to remain overnight due to delays, cancellations or diversions; (11) es-
tablish task force to recommend ways to coordinate emergency contingency
plans with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays; (12) establish task
force to review and recommend a plan to help ensure that airport display
monitors are accurate; (13) make lowest fare available on airline telephone reser-
vation system also available at airline ticket offices and airport ticket counters;
(14) establish system that will enable passengers to know whether their flight is
delayed or cancelled before they depart for the airport; (15) establish focus
groups from the disabled and special needs community to review and make rec-
ommendations on services provided to passengers with disabilities; (16) conduct
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oppose the legislation, proclaiming their voluntary plans as suc-
cessful in light of an increasingly incapable aviation infrastruc-
ture and warning that the uniformity of the PBOR legislation
would generate unwanted costs that would be passed on to con-
sumers.1"3 Nevertheless, legislators moved forward and nearly
set the rejuvenated PBOR legislation for a vote.10 4 Then the
events of September 11 occurred.
The following discussion examines the issues informing the
PBOR legislation and the contours of modern airline travel
along a theme that the importance of such proposals is not lost
or diminished by the events of September 11 and, afortiori, that
a new era of regulation may arrive.
III. DISCUSSION
A. WHITHER DEREGULATION?
Broadly, the legislative and popular movement toward legally
enforceable passengers' rights implicitly asks two questions: (1)
whether the promises of economic deregulation are broken;0 5
and (2) whether such promises ever actually were capable of be-
ing fulfilled. Thus far, airline deregulation scholarship and the
governing law have approached this inquiry by focusing princi-
pally on economics - a business assessment comparing the rela-
tive and related social costs and benefits of deregulation with
those of the pre-1978 regulatory structure. In this economic
context, airline deregulation analyses have studied the impact
annual review of regional code-share partners' customer service plan (except
ATA member airlines or their affiliates); and (17) clarify terminology used in
customer service plans to advise passengers what to expect during "extended pe-
riods of time" and "emergency." S. 319, 107th Cong. (2001).
0o3 Hearing on Airline Customer Service Commitments: Status Report Before the House
Transp. & Infrastructure Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Glenn R.
Zander, President and Chief Executive Officer, Aloha Airlines, Inc.) ("The impo-
sition of 'one-size-fits-all' mandatory customer service requirements will stifle in-
novation, choke new entrants, and cause even healthy customer friendly carriers
to undertake inappropriate, expensive and counter productive actions simply be-
cause the bureaucracy demands them.").
104 Adrian Schofield, Special Report on Airline Customer Service Commitments,
WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, May 11, 2001, at Bi; Marilyn Adams, Senate Soon Puts Fliers'
Rights to Vote, USA TODAY, May 5, 2001, at B1; Jane Wooldridge, Airlines Pressed to
Step Up Service, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 1, 2001, at Al.
105 CONSUMERS UNION, DEREGULATED (2002) (reasoning that "[b]roken
promises, deceptive marketing, and dreadful service have become accepted busi-
ness practices in an increasingly Wild Wild West marketplace" and recom-
mending consumer protections in the nature of a truth-in-airfares disclosure and
a passenger bill of rights).
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and extent of the Deregulation Act on airline management, in-
frastructure, industry health and trends, market entry, and la-
bor.1"6 Surprisingly, these discussions have not emphasized the
deteriorating state of passenger service - airport or in-flight rela-
tions between passenger and carrier - in practical, non-eco-
nomic terms. Rather, commentators have discussed service in
the deregulated environment as a function of access, that is, in
terms of the number of destinations airlines serve, the commen-
surate reduction in service for small communities, 0 7 and com-
petitive fares or carrier alternatives.' The PBOR legislation
provides a new and recent context in which to examine the
practical consequences of airline deregulation and to reassess
the still-pending question of what amount of government activ-
ism in the airline industry, if any, will promote competitive, free
market policies. The social regulatory impulses informing pas-
sengers' rights legislation represents a significant shift in der-
egulation policy.
After the Great Depression and for several decades thereafter,
Americans recoiled from the idea of free market competition as
a vehicle for generating and sustaining, among other public util-
ities, a national air transportation system.10 9 In 1938, the Civil
Aeronautics Board ("CAB") 110 was created and charged with ec-
onomic regulation of the burgeoning airline industry, which ini-
tially was in the business of transporting mail, not passengers."'
106 See, e.g., PAUL S. DEMPSEY ET AL., AIRLINE MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (Coast Aire Publications 1997).
107 See generally Arnold I. Havens & David A. Heymsfeld, Small Community Air
Service Under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 641 (1981).
108 See, e.g., Herbert D. Kelleher, Deregulation and the Troglodytes - How the Air-
lines Met Adam Smith, 50J. AIR L. & COM. 299, 304 (1985) [hereinafter Kelleher,
How the Airlines Met Adam Smith] ("Deregulation has produced substantial societal
benefits in the form of lower fares, increased service, diversity of service and price
alternatives, reduced industry concentration, more efficient allocation of re-
sources and, in the long run, a more healthy, efficient and innovative airline
industry.").
109 Bradley Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
75, 81 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
110 The CAB was referred to as the "Civil Aeronautics Authority" until 1940. In
1984, the Congress dissolved the CAB and transferred its remaining functions to
the DOT. The Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-793, 98
Stat. 2857 (1984).
111 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938). For
early commentary considering the interplay between regulation and competition
under the CAB's governance, see Howard C. Westwood & Alexander E. Bennett,
A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterword,
42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 309, 311 (1967); SAMUEL B. RiCHMOND, REGULATION AND
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The CAB strictly monitored airlines and the substantial competi-
tive impulses among them. 1 2 The CAB's authority reached in-
terstate air travel and included the exclusive power to grant
operating permits, approve and assign routes and services to cer-
tain communities,' 13 set air travel prices,' 14 and control market
entry and anti-competitive practices.1 15 Such regulation was
thought necessary to protect the fledgling airline industry, pre-
vent airlines from engaging in destructive and cannibalistic com-
petition, and facilitate and ensure growth of a nominal
commercial aviation industry. In fact, in this controlled environ-
ment, the airline industry consisted of an oligopoly of only four
carriers.'" Relatively free from the modern and market-borne
pressures of competition, early airline travel was the private pre-
serve of the well-to-do and the nascent, government-protected
air carriers generally focused on providing quality service to
these few. Over time, however, the bases presented in support
of government regulation and positive federal guardianship of a
viable, but restrained airline industry, eroded as a more mobile
society arose.
Deregulation impulses overtook regulatory schemes as the
modern era of mass airline transportation evolved.'1 7 In 1974,
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), then-Chair of the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Committee on the Judiciary, set out to investigate the CAB's
regulation. Senator Kennedy sought the advice of (now United
COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION (Columbia University Press 1961); PAUL W.
CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE POLICY: A STUDY OF DOMESTIC AIRLINE PASSENGER
FARES (1958); A.J. THOMAS,JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION OF SCHEDULED AIR TRANS-
PORT 3-17 (1951); Frederick A. Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARv. L.
REV. 1235 (1947).
112 CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 317-18 (1961).
113 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 401, 52 Stat. 973, 987
(1938).
114 Id. § 1002(d), 52 Stat. at 1018-19.
"5 Id. § 408(a), 52 Stat. at 1000-02.
116 American, Eastern, Transcontinental & Western Air (later TWA), and
United Air Lines comprised the "Big Four" or the so-called major or trunk
carriers.
117 Unlike the impulses recommending deregulation, the PBOR legislation is
an outgrowth of passenger dissatisfaction. James W. Callison, Airline Deregulation -
Only Partially a Hoax: The Current Status of the Airline Deregulation Movement, 45 J.
AIR L. & COM. 961, 964 n.4 (1980) ("The impetus for change came almost en-
tirely from the academics and politicians; the public never did call for deregula-
tion of the airline industry. Various public opinion polls had shown that the
airlines consistently ranked at the very top among all industries in terms of con-
sumer satisfaction and confidence.").
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States Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer, a Harvard Law
School professor, who was retained to head the subcommit-
tee."18 Ultimately, on October 24, 1978, PresidentJimmy Carter
signed into law the Deregulation Act. This act, by amending the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, freed the airlines of federal regula-
tion, and allowed, by-and-large, a market-driven commercial avi-
ation system." 9 As a direct result, an ever-broadening base of
air travelers availed itself of abundant air transportation options
made possible by the creation of numerous air carriers, each
operating at competitive fares with regular frequency on choice
routes. In the aggregate, culturally and sociologically, airline
travel became familiar and passengers' awe with airplane travel
was replaced with a no-nonsense expectation of getting to a des-
tination cheaply, quickly, and safely.
As the number of airline passengers increased, the deregu-
lated commercial aviation market experienced a number of con-
vulsions that contributed to the current transition in passenger
attitude. Most notably, commercial airlines in the 1980s and
1990s engaged in the very cannibalistic behavior that the CAB,
pre-deregulation policy and deregulation opponents
shunned. 20 At another level, the provision of non-essential, in-
flight passenger services declined or was altogether abandoned
("no frills") as the number of amazingly low fare offerings in-
creased.' 2 1 The business objective of mass access to air transpor-
tation anchoring deregulation policy was attained, but
potentially at the cost of passenger care and at the risk of passen-
ger resentment. The tangible economic benefits of deregula-
tion, vis-A-vis low airfares and frequent flight offerings, masked
passenger inconveniences, which, until recently, seemed to be
118 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restric-
tive Alternatives and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REv. 547 (1979).
119 But see Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating "Deregulation" of Commercial Air Travel:
False Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 109, 116 (1989) (clarifying: "dichotomization [between regulation
and deregulation] is false. . . 'Deregulation' has in fact meant eliminating a few,
specific controls while retaining all others. Air travel today, [for example,] as in
the past, is totally dependent on the existence and effective operation of such
industry specific controls as the FAA's air traffic system.").
120 See, e.g., Wesley G. Kaldahl, Let the Process of Deregulation Continue, 50 J. AiR
L. & CoM. 285, 295 (1985) ("The public has not benefited. There is less nonstop
service, most lengthy trips require stops at intermediate hubs, and fares are
widely inconsistent and tend to favor the few chosen markets.") (emphasis in
original).
121 See Melanie Trottman & Scott McCartney, The Age of 'Wal-Mart' Airlines
Crunches the Biggest Carriers, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at Al.
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an acceptable price for, or condition of, such benefits. Airline
management effectively cultivated a passenger culture that came
to accept service limitations, 122 including reduced seat pitch and
meager in-flight meals (if even provided) .23 Airline passengers
increasingly have come to view themselves for what airline eco-
nomic deregulation policy has always understood them to be -
variables in an equation based on the profit-driven axiom that
"airplanes are marginal costs with wings." 124
The service-oriented PBOR proposals mandate service and be-
havioral rather than economic regulation. The proposals sug-
gest that the commercial airline industry has come full circle,
from regulation to deregulation and potentially back again, al-
beit with some mutation. 125 The various proposals do not neces-
sarily purport to re-regulate the commercial aviation industry in
pure economic terms (i.e., fares and routes), but they promise
to regulate airline conduct. Moreover, the PBOR legislation
revisits concerns that deregulation opponents raised over two
decades ago and, in doing so, suggests that the mature airline
market may not have evolved as planned or prognosticated. As
a former pilot remarked:
In the past, the airlines' goal was to get people out of trains and
buses and into airplanes. With larger, faster airplanes and der-
egulation, this goal was achieved. We are well aware of the re-
sults. With low fares and giveaways, and even with full loads, the
122 LAURENCE E. GESELL, APLINE RE-REGULATION 17 (Coast Aire Publications
1990) (hypothesizing that "there has been an increase in finance-oriented man-
agers during the airline deregulatory process . . .that . . .results in negative
welfare interests.").
123 Whether consisting only of peanuts and non-alcoholic beverages or some-
thing more substantial, in-flight meals have become the penultimate representa-
tion of the corporate bottom-line championing service. See, e.g., Carol Sottili, Can
Airline Food Get Worse? Hold On To Your Tray Table, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002, at
E01; Mark Bittman & Susan Catto, Airlines Put Passengers on Forced Diets, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at 8; Tom Belden, Don't Count on Tasty Airline Food, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, July 15, 2001, at H2. Airlines modified meal service after the
events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent anthrax poison scares. See, e.g.,
Michael Janofsky, Airline Stops Offering Creamer and Sweetener, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2001, at 6.
124 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry, 20
TRANSP. LJ. 9, 10 (1991) (quoting Alfred Kahn). See supra text accompanying
note 87.
125 GESELL, supra note 122, at 119-47. See, e.g., Stephen G. Wood, Regulation,
Deregulation and Re-Regulation: An American Perspective, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 381
(1987) (describing a "patch-work" reality "whose ingredients consist of un-
changed regulation, deregulation, part regulation/part competition, stalled reg-
ulation, and re-regulation.").
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airlines are struggling. It should not be cheaper to fly than to
take surface transportation. I suggest reinstating the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to promote air transportation and control prices.
Let the FAA do its job of regulation. People will continue to fly
even at increased fares. It should be a pleasure to fly, not an
ordeal. 126
Regulatory opponents, however, argue that the provision of
qualitatively-sound service is a function of marketplace forces
and competition, not legislative mandate. 127 As one aviation
consultant aptly noted: "[i]t's very hard to legislate care and
feeling and empathy. ' 12 Importantly, then, the passengers'
rights legislation represents a critical point at which regulatory
and deregulatory impulses interface. Indeed, the traumatic
events of September 11 suggest that some form of regulation,
which was merely desired by passengers' rights proponents, now
may be required. To be sure, where passengers' rights legisla-
tion focused on improving airline conduct, recent anecdotal evi-
126 Letter from Capt. (ret.) Robert L. Bowman to Managing Editor, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 17, 2001, at 9.
127 One commentator assessed the remarks of a former United Airlines CEO as
follows:
He says, "We're in the service business. And if we don't find ways to
provide that level of service, passengers will obviously find other
airlines that can." Now, that's not just spin; that's a pretty good
point. Why in the world would the airlines intentionally aggravate
their customers? Congress doesn't need to tell restaurants to serve
tasty food. Restaurants that serve bad food go out of business.
This is all about members of Congress and how they're treated by
the airlines . . .This is about them. This is about their inconve-
niences, and they're taking it out on the country - not the first
time.
CAN Crossfire, Is It Time for Congress to Give Airline Passengers More Rights? (CNN
television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001). But see James Higgins, The Industry You Love
to Hate, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 19, 2001, at 24 ("the problem isn't that airlines
have an incentive to antagonize their customers, but that the airlines lack an in-
centive not to antagonize their customers") (emphasis in original).
128 Katie Culbertson, ATA Fights Image Problem Caused by Bill of Rights, IND. Bus.
J., Mar. 29, 1999, at 9a. One industry player contends:
At this advanced stage in the game, it is clearly preferable that the
marketplace, rather than the government, determine America's fu-
ture and the future of the industry. While the government contin-
ues to hold an important position pertaining to safety, other issues
are best left to free enterprise and open competition, just as the
proponents of deregulation intended.
Kaldahl, supra note 120, at 297 (emphasis in original).
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dence suggests a need for more forceful regulation in the other
direction - passenger conduct relative to air carriers.
B. CULTURAL DEVOLUTION
The PBOR legislation arises, in part, from tense and antago-
nistic airport and flight-cabin environments. The tragedies of
September 11 only inflame this reality. The promise of deregu-
lation of readily-accessible air travel, coupled with infrastructure
inadequacies, has produced an experience that often negates
expected temporal and cost benefits of commercial air travel. 129
A decline in airport and in-flight culture may be traced to a con-
flict borne of deregulation policy "between the demand for con-
venience and the demand for value." 3 ' Economically liberated
by the Deregulation Act of 1978, airlines effectuated and maxi-
mized their new liberties by testing passengers' willingness to
cope with less service and amenities in exchange for low fares
and myriad flight offerings. Indeed, passengers occupied them-
selves primarily with getting from one point to another at the
least expensive rate, generally without concern for creature
comforts.I3I In its early stages, economic deregulation prompted
carriers to offer low fares with reduced or no in-flight service or
conveniences beyond those necessary or required. Consumers
immediately benefited from unprecedented "fare wars" and wel-
comed value over convenience. Airline passenger service be-
came a relatively undifferentiated product and often included
nothing more than "pure transportation. 132 No-frills airlines
such as People Express, for example, embraced deregulation
129 See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
I30 THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., HARD LANDING 290-91 (1995). An initial conse-
quence of September 11 in terms of economics and social mobility is the airline
industry's reassessment of business models favoring value over convenience:
(Moderator):... Are we going to look back and laugh that there was
ever any luxuries aloft when Americans flew?
Robert Crandall ... The public has been offered a choice, in effect,
between quite high levels of convenience and service on the one
hand and very low prices on the other. And the public has clearly
come down in favor of the lowest possible price.... And I think the
answer is, yes, over time, I think the public will find that air travel is
less accessible, less ubiquitous and less service-oriented, perhaps
more efficient and more price-oriented, but less convenient, less
easy to use that has been the case in the past.
NBC NEWS' Meet the Press, supra note 6.
131 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DER-
EGULATION 111 (1989).
132 Id. at 115.
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policy and democratized air travel, making commercial flight
more approachable to the largest cross-section of an increas-
ingly mobile population than ever before. A sort of (air)bus cul-
ture resulted. Over time, however, passengers have found
intolerable aspects of bottom-line, deregulation policy they ini-
tially sustained.
The PBOR legislation suggests that, confronted by delays, can-
cellations, diversions, and reduced market choice, 3 modern
airline passengers, and the government officials among them,
are unable to find either convenience or value in the commer-
cial airline system. Moreover, the proposed PBOR legislation in-
dicates that passengers also are unwilling to make any more (or
more significant) sacrifices in order to obtain a low fare. 134 The
outcry for passengers' rights also implies that passengers have
become so accustomed to the benefits of air travel as to overlook
all that is involved in airplane transportation. The awe and civil-
ity with which early airline passengers approached commercial
airliner travel plainly is missing in today's traveler, replaced in-
stead with knee-jerk cynicism. 1 5 Yet, the proposed preventative
legislation does not, and cannot, reconstitute convenience or
value that the deregulated airline market fails to offer, because
this legislation does nothing to temper passenger behavior and
expectations. The passengers' rights legislation, with its singular
focus on airline behavior, collectively fails to establish laws capa-
ble of, or a universally-applicable policy for, reforming the social
and cultural deterioration in the relationship among the gov-
ernment, passengers, and airlines with respect to commercial air
travel. 136
133 See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
134 Paul D. Winston, Planes Should Fly, but Old Ways Won't, Bus. INS., Sept. 24,
2001, at 41 (opining that "improvement can come without undue federal control,
but only if we stop settling for terrible customer service. Our grudging tolerance
for the poor quality of air travel permits that condition to persist."); Frances Fi-
orino, Passengers Enraged, but Does Industry Care, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
June 14, 1999, at 122 (quoting "1998 Airline Quality Rating": "consumers are
near the breaking point with dissatisfaction"). PETZINCER, JR., supra note 130, at
339 (discussing "a principle as old as passenger flight itself: people will tolerate
many sacrifices to fly, but they will not tolerate surprise. They may sit with their
knees to their chest for a low fare, but they will not stand for a lost bag.").
135 Discontent in the Coach Cabin, supra note 36, at HO (recording that
"[a]lthough passengers assume an airline is lying when things go wrong, when
everything goes smoothly and flights arrive on time, they don't complain.").
136 Ren J. Francillon, Softies and Gripers - The Airline Customer Service Improvement
Act Versus Historical Reality, AIRLINERS, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 30 [hereinafter Francil-
Ion, Softies and Gripers] (asserting that passengers themselves are the enemy and
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A population of travelers responding to travel-related and
other pressures in markedly antisocial ways has replaced the
generally exclusive and affluent culture that occupied early, pre-
deregulation airports and flight cabins. Modern airline passen-
gers hurry to airports often only to wait in congested concourses
or on parked planes.'37 Even the most passive of passengers
manifest frustration with the hustle of modern air travel. Not
surprisingly, airline passenger civility and decency have declined
noticeably as passengers engage in inappropriate and dangerous
conduct toward their fellow travelers and airport and flight per-
sonnel.'38 Passengers are angry and violent, whether en route to
that "[f]oolishly, Congress and the press now blame the airlines, the FAA and the
airport authorities for a situation engendered by public demand and overly re-
strictive environmental considerations.").
137 Paul Mann, Airlines Treat Patrons 'Like Cattle, 'Feds Say, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 7, 2000, at 52.
138 Hopeful passengers have imagined a code of conduct, which, while short of
a legally enforceable passengers' bill of rights, identify prevalent issues con-
fronting commercial airline travelers:
Dear Ann Landers:
A lot of people are traveling this summer, and my friends and I
came up with a list of suggestions that we would like to call "Airline
Etiquette." I hope you will print our list:
1. Be courteous to the crew and fellow passengers. One rude per-
son in a small area makes for a very unpleasant trip for
everyone.
2. If there is no room in the overhead for your carry-on luggage,
put your bag in the foot space in front of your legs. If you have
a hang-up bag, ask the flight attendant where it should go.
3. Do not bring an overstuffed carry-on bag that won't fit in the
assigned space. Bring only important, necessary items with
your.
4. Do not lean your back seat any farther than absolutely neces-
sary. Most airlines have so little leg room that you head will be
on another passenger's lap.
5. If you must recline your seat, be sure to put it in the upright
position when food is served. The person behind you will ap-
preciate it.
6. If the person next to you spills a drink, offer them your napkin,
and press the call button for the flight attendant. Your seat-
mate will have his hands full.
7. Be considerate of the passenger in front of you. Do not bump
or kick the seat. Don't slam the tray table. Use care when re-
moving items from the seat pocket.
8. On long flights, be quiet when the cabin lights are dimmed.
You may want to have a loud conversation, but other people
are trying to sleep.
9. Keep the volume down on personal entertainment devices such
as CD players and videogame players, or use headphones.
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the airport (i.e., "road rage"), while waiting in line at the termi-
nal counter (i.e., "ground rage"), or once airborne (i.e., "air
rage").139 Anecdotal evidence suggests that any air traveler is
capable of manifesting outrageous conduct:14 ° both sexes, any
nationality,'41 the business traveler in first class or the holiday
traveler in economy, 142 celebrities,"' politicians,'44 television
10. Please demonstrate good hygiene. Airplanes are stuffy. Take a
shower, and put on clean clothes before getting on board. The
person next to you will be grateful.
Letter from Fellow Travelers in Queen Creek, Ariz. to Ann Landers, MIAMI HER-
ALD, July 27, 2002, at 9E.
139 Air rage is a general intent crime defined and punishable by federal law as
follows:
An individual on an aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of
the United States who, by assaulting or intimidating a flight crew
member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the per-
formance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the
ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties, at-
tempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.
49 U.S.C. § 46504 (1996 & Supp. 2002); see also 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.11, 121.580, and
135.120 (2001); ANGELA DAHLBERG, AIR RAGE: THE UNDERESTIMATED SAFETY RISK
(2001); Marshall Wilson, Airline Rage Policies Assailed, Unruly Passengers Often Un-
prosecuted, Crews Say, S.F. CHRON.,July 7, 2001, at A13 (reporting "Global Zero Air
Rage Day" and contrasting FAA's report of 314 cases of "unruly passengers" dur-
ing 2000 versus industry's contention of over 4000 air rage incidents per year);
Tory A. Weigand, Air Rage and Legal Pitfalls for State-Based Claims Challenging Airline
Regulation of Passenger Conduct During Flight, BOSTON B. J., May/June 2001, at 10;
Mann, Airline and Government Bans on Unruly Passengers, supra note 2; Nancy Lee
Firak & Kimberly A. Schmaltz, Air Rage: Choice of Law for Intentional Torts Occurring
Over International Waters, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (defining air rage as "inten-
tional acts that are highly disproportionate to motivating factors, which endanger
the flight crew and/or other passengers and potentially jeopardize the safety of
the aircraft itself.").
140 See, e.g., ELLIOTT HESTER, PLANE INSANITY: A FLIGHT ATTENDANT'S TALES OF
SEX, RAGE AND QUEASINESS AT 30,000 FEET (St. Martin's Press 2002).
141 Air rage is not a phenomenon peculiar to U.S. airline travel. For example,
the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority estimated that air rage incidents
occurred an average of once out of every 870 flights. Air Rage Incidents Four Times
a Day, BIRMINGHAM POST, Feb. 19, 2000, at 8; see also Off-Duty SAA Steward Goes
Berserk on Plane, THE STAR (South Africa), Feb. 26, 2002, available at http://
www.iol.co.za/index.php?setid=lclickid=13 (reporting a drunk attendant on
board a Bangkok to Johannesburg flight who, for thirty minutes, "tore down the
aisles, swearing and taking swipes at passengers.., biting some on their arms and
hands . . . and forcing himself on a Chinese woman and kissing her," until re-
strained by fellow passengers).
142 Joan Fleischman, Miami Lawyer Yanked Off Flight to Colorado, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 27, 2002, at 4A.
143 Jo Bowman, How 747 Pilot Knocked Out Drunken Pop Star, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 23, 2000, at 1.
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producers, 145 journalists, 146 and even clergy.1 47 Some instances
of travel rage leave little to the imagination, as when a business-
man defecated on an in-use service cart 48 or, post-September
11, when a banker on an airborne international flight tried "to
talk to the captain" by applying several "kung fu" kicks to the
reinforced cockpit door.'49 Even when not traveling, a segment
of passengers appears preoccupied with terrible travel exper-
iences, creating and contributing to a bitter Internet culture,
e.g., AirlinesSuck.com, AirTravelComplaints.com, AmericanAir-
linesSucks.org, NorthWorstAir.org, Passengerrights.com,
SkyRage.com, Ticked.com, TravelProblems.com and Un-
tied.com. 15 ° Aside from psychological impulses, travel phobias,
and other motivators of air rage, 151 the range of inappropriate
and threatening behavior passengers exhibit may be connected
to the operation (or lack thereof) of a saturated deregulated
commercial airline system.' 5 2
Of course, unlawful or disruptive behavior does not arise in a
vacuum, but often may be an unintended consequence of air-
line operations. Increasingly, passengers feel neglected or pur-
posefully mistreated by the deregulated airlines, which appear
unable or unwilling to both manage dense traffic patterns and
144 Air Crew Urged to Name Unruly Politicians, BBC NEWS, July 6, 2000, at http://
news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia_pacific/newsid_822000/
822105.stm.
145 TV Producer Jailed for "Air Rage", at http://www.thisislondon.co.uk.
146 Amy Worden, N. Y. Columnist Busted at Iowa Airport, APB.NEWS.CoM, Jan. 25,
2000, at http://www.apbnews.com/media/celebnews/2000/01/25/dunleavy
0125_01.html?stf.mail.
14v "Hour of Power's" Robert Shuller Denies Assaulting Airline Attendant, at http://
www.cnn.com/US/9707/02/schuller.assault/ (July 2, 1997) (reporting
televangelist Rev. Schuller accused of placing a flight attendant in a head lock);
Complaint, Elabiad v. Schuller, No. 97-4907 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Complaint, United
States v. Robert Schuller, No. 97-1194M (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
148 Complaint, United States v. Gerard B. Finneran, No. 95-1744M (E.D.N.Y.
1995).
149 Martin Merzer et al., Crew's Ax Stops Cockpit Intruder, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8,
2002, at 1A (reporting that the co-pilot subdued the panicked passenger by hit-
ting him in the head with the blunt end of an ax).
150 See generally, Marilyn Adams, More Fliers Land on the Internet to Air Complaints,
USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 2000, at 12B.
'51 See Keith L. Alexander, Raising a Glass or Two - No More - To Safety in Flight,
WASH. POST, July 25, 2001, at E01 (discussing Senator Dianne Feinstein's (D-Cal.)
letter to airline executives threatening to introduce legislation if the airlines did
not "voluntarily" limit the number of alcoholic drinks served to passengers).
152 See discussion infra Part 1II.D.1.
968
RE-REGULATION AND RIGHTS
provide quality service.' 53 Passengers increasingly analogize
their air travel experiences to hostage situations while, recipro-
cally, flight crews regard passengers as "the enemy. "154 Moreo-
ver, historically, bitter relations between airlines and labor, and
even the government and labor, have directly impacted air trav-
elers in the nature of, for example, choreographed slow-downs
and sick-outs. 155 Passengers are a natural target for labor to
manifest the frustrations they harbor toward their carrier-em-
ployer. 156 Surprisingly, the PBOR legislation does not addresses
labor as an element in the deterioration of passenger service
even though some members of Congress blamed organized la-
bor as a cause in fact of commercial air transportation woes. 157
Ironically, while face-to-face interaction between passengers
and crews is a source of conflict, computers and other technolo-
gies intended to improve airline service and to hasten the travel
processes also contribute to passenger frustration by reducing
the amount of personal contact between passengers and the air-
line corporate giants.158 As a result, the processes accompanying
153 Bowen & Headley, supra note 7, at 6 ("Qualitative assessment of consumer
experiences indicates an increasing frequency of consumer/employee confronta-
tions that clearly stem from management policies and practices that encourage
misinformation regarding flight status information and flight delays."); Airline
Crews Demand More Action to Curb Passenger Rage, MIAMI HERALD,July 7, 2001, at 2A
(quoting a passenger, "It's air rage because the airlines aren't doing their jobs to
secure those attendants ... If they would give out information in a timely man-
ner, you wouldn't see air rage."); GESELL, supra note 122, at 17.
154 Doug Gamble, Remember the "Fiendly Skies?", SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 15,
1999, at 12 (stating that "there is no private-sector business with more open hostil-
ity between server and customer than that which exists with the airline
industry.").
155 See generally, GEORGE E. HOPKINS, THE AIRLINE PILOTS: A STUDY IN ELITE
UNIONIZATION (2000); AARON BERNSTEIN, GROUNDED: FRANK LORENZO AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF EASTERN AIRLINES (1999); AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL ERA: THE NEW FRONTIER (Peter Cappelli ed., 1995); Laurie Schoder,
Note, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Effect of Airline Deregulation on Labor Relations,
22 TRANSP. L.J. 105 (1994); CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS
SINCE DEREGULATION (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1988); Beth S. Adler, Comment, Der-
egulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New Judicial Interpretation of the Railway
Labor Act, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1003 (1986).
156 Ina Paiva Cordle, 'We're Not Asking for the World', MIAMI HERALD, June 3,
2001, at 6E (quoting an American Airlines flight attendant, "When I see they are
not willing to pacify us, and we're not asking for a huge chunk of change, it
makes me ask: 'Do I want to do a good job for them?"').
157 Delays Spur Growing Interest in Antitrust Immunity for Carriers, AIRLINE FIN.
NEWS, Feb. 19, 2001, at 1 (referring to Senator Trent Lott's (R-Miss.) statement
that labor "was a major part of the problem" in causing delays).
158 E.g., Ruwantissa Abeyratne, E-Commerce and the Airline Passenger, 66J. AIR L.
& COM. 1345 (2001). See also Marilyn Adams, Tech Takes Bigger Role in Air Service,
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commercial airline flight, from reservations to enplanement and
beyond, create miserable experiences. For example, in arrang-
ing air travel, passengers confront an intentional, almost puni-
tive, lack of uniformity of fares varied only by special conditions
and restrictions.' 59 Then, once aboard a flight, whatever the fare
eventually paid, passengers strain into seats whose slight seat
pitch is a source of popular culture comedy (and potentially a
contributor to a serious medical condition). 6 ' In all, airline
passengers may perceive themselves on the outside of a national
blame game, whereby:
It]he airlines point to the air traffic control system and the
shortage of airport runway capacity. The airports point to the
need for airspace redesign, new technologies, and to airline
schedule practices. The FAA and DOT point to airline practices
like flight bunching in which 50 percent of all arrivals and depar-
tures are scheduled to arrive or depart in two minutes exactly on
the hour or the half-hour. The customer points to all of the
above and just wants it fixed.'
In any event, the terrorism of September 11 ushered in a new
reality that, among other things, invigorates the finger-pointing
among government, industry, and passengers, and exacerbates
distrust between carriers and their consumers.1
12
C. CONTRACT As PANACEA
The PBOR legislation is important and questionable because
it intends to achieve qualitatively-sound commercial airline ser-
vice by legislative mandate. In 2001, armed with statistical and
anecdotal evidence of deplorable airline service, Congressional
passengers' rights proponents contended that the airlines' vol-
untary "Customer Service Plans" effected in 1999 had failed en-
tirely. Consequently, passengers' rights advocates zealously
USA TODAY, July 18, 2001, at IB (observing that "[t]oday, you can book a domes-
tic flight, check in, upgrade from coach to business class, reserve a window or
aisle seat, get a boarding pass and check luggage - all without speaking to a
human.").
159 Carstensen, supra note 119, at 144 ("It appears ... that almost every seat on
a flight has its own unique price.").
160 E.g., Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Economy Class Syndrome and Air Carrier Liabil-
ity, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 251 (2001).
16, Air Traffic Congestion in the New York-New Jersey Metropolitian Region: Hearing
Before The Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Aviation, 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of William R. DeCota, Director of Aviation, Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey).
162 See discussion infra Part III.E.
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asserted that real relief for passengers would result only if such
plans were codified to require the airlines to adopt and incorpo-
rate into their respective contracts of carriage the twelve points
enumerated in the 1999 Airline Customer Service Commit-
ment. '6 Legislators reached this infirm conclusion on the sup-
position that the deregulated airlines disregard passenger
service, focusing instead on obtaining and maintaining passen-
ger volume not on the basis of service, but with the allure of
nothing more than "pure transportation" at fares as low or be-
neath those of competitors. Succumbing to the threat of the
PBOR becoming enforceable law, the ATA airlines incorporated
the twelve service terms into their respective contracts of car-
riage by May, 2001.
Such contract rights are no rights at all because they now exist
(and were advocated in the first place) in an environment in
which breaches are not only contemplated but expected. As
such, proponents of the PBOR quixotically imagine legal solu-
tions to purely business problems, thereby raising more expan-
sive concerns about whether the legislative directive of service-
based contract rights represents the first of future governmental
intrusions into the service-related aspects of the deregulated air-
line marketplace. 64 In promoting service through contract, the
PBOR legislation overlooks the further and substantial inconve-
nience aggrieved passengers will face in pursuing enforcement
of any newly created rights in an already over-burdened court
system. The notion that contract will improve commercial air-
line service is specious.
At first glance, contract, as a vehicle for securing otherwise
transient airline promises to improve service, is appealing for
several reasons. Principally, decisional law of the United States
Supreme Court holds that the Deregulation Act does not pre-
empt breach of contract claims.'65 As such, state court resources
163 See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Tom Ramstack, Senate Panel Lands on
Airlines: Industry Defends Customer-Service Efforts in Wake of Report, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2001, at B9 (quoting Senator Wyden, "I've heard this bottomless pit of ex-
cuses now for 18 months.... I hope we can get enforceable rights for passengers
in the legislation this time.").
164 Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 699 (1990) ("[C]ontractarians neglect the im-
plications of the fact that contracts are not self-enforcing.... They see contract as
a device by which parties control their relations and achieve their desires by con-
sent. Their approach thus misconceives contract because all law, including con-
tract, is regulatory.").
165 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233-34 (1995).
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are available to allegedly aggrieved passengers.166 Next, contract
theory makes airlines directly accountable to their passengers in
ways that other legal mechanisms do not and cannot. That is,
"[u]nlike DOT regulations, which are enforced by government
and may result in administrative or civil enforcement actions
against an air carrier, contracts of carriage confer upon custom-
ers, enforceable rights directly against an air carrier."'167 Fur-
thermore, in contrast to existing regulations, the twelve service
terms now incorporated into several airlines' contracts of car-
riage specifically address and emphasize communication be-
tween carrier and passenger. In this regard, the contractual
terms contemplated by the PBOR legislation - promising notifi-
cation of known delays, cancellations, and diversions, etc. - ex-
ceed the requirements of existing regulations governing
overbooking, 16 lost baggage, 169 handicap access,1 70 and smok-
ing prohibition.' 17  While responsive to some pre-, in-, and post-
flight practices and procedures, these existing regulations do
not squarely address communication between carrier and pas-
senger. Last, inasmuch as DOT regulations governing airline is-
sues generally would take years to promulgate, 172  the
incorporation of service terms into an airline's contract of car-
riage represents immediate (government-inspired) action, if not
result. Notwithstanding these niceties that recommend contract
166 Matthew Azoulay, Note, American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens: The Supreme
Court's Reregulation of the Airline Industry, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 405, 407 (1996)
(arguing that "the Court failed to recognize that a state is 'enforcing or enacting'
law when one of its courts determines that a party has breached a contractual
obligation. Consequently, the majority's holding will subject airlines to the de-
mands of various state courts thereby imposing burdensome and costly standards
on the airline industry.").
167 FINAL REPOrrr, supra note 93, at 35; see 49 U.S.C. § 41707; 14 C.F.R. § 253
(2001) ("[A]n air carrier may incorporate by reference in a ticket or written in-
strument any term of the contract for providing interstate air transportation.").
168 14 C.F.R. § 250 (2001); see generally, Note, Federal Preemption of State Law: The
Example of Overbooking in the Airline Industry, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1200 (1976).
169 49 U.S.C. § 41704 (1994); see also 14 C.F.R. § 254 (2001); Terry L. Turner,
Carry-On Baggage - Are the Regulations Doing Their Job?, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 565
(1998).
170 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2001); see also 14 C.F.R. § 382 (2001).
171 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (2001); 14 C.F.R. § 252 (2001); see also Alan Stephens,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Nonsmoking Regulations, 65
A.L.R. 4th 1205 (2000).
172 On average the DOT takes 3.8 years to pass regulations. Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Hearing on GAO Report on the FAA Rulemaking Process, 107th Cong. (2001). See
also Paul Mann, Mead Gingerly Backs Legislative Reforms, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Feb. 19, 2001, at 44.
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as a guardian of good airline service, incorporation of the Cus-
tomer Service Plan into the airlines' contracts of carriage raises
basic problems of contract law and represents an inefficient allo-
cation of private, public, and judicial resources.
The paramount insufficiency of the contract-based legislation
is the inadequacy of remedy and the associated costs of pursuing
any recovery. When passengers purchase tickets for air travel
they do not imagine their final destination as a court of law.17 3
Passengers merely want to get to wherever it is they are going,
safely. 174 As such, it is doubtful that hurried airline passengers in
the deregulated environment seeking "pure transportation" will
involve themselves in an examination and comparison of the
several airlines' contracts of carriage. Even then, passengers dil-
igent in learning about airline offerings might become frus-
trated by the lack of uniformity and subtle differences among
options offered by the several carriers, notwithstanding broad
contractual obligations to provide as much information as possi-
ble. 175 Similarly, unsuspecting passengers may not realize that
some (non-ATA) airlines never agreed to incorporate the twelve
points into their contracts of carriage. 176
As a practical matter, enforcement of any service-related con-
tract rights may be more expensive, in terms of time and money,
than the value of any breach. 177 Moreover, the legislative man-
date of contract will not cure all problems associated with air
travel such as when an unaccompanied minor bound for Detroit
173 Keith L. Alexander, Passenger Rights Expanded, WASH. POST, June 8, 2001, at
E01 (quoting Senator Wyden, "The airlines are saying the passengers can try to
protect themselves in court. But it's going to be a long time before they get a
remedy.").
174 Discontent in the Coach Cabin, supra note 36, at H01 ("In other words, a satis-
fying flight is one in which a passenger gets through the system fast.").
175 Compare AMERICA WEST AIRLINES, INC., CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE - DOMESTIC
U.S. 300-1 (2001) ("Fares not available via our telephone reservations system may
include discounts offered on internet web sites, tour, package fares or other dis-
tribution channels.") with DELTA AIRLINES, INC., DELTA DOMESTIC GENERAL RULES
TARIFF 165 (2001) ("A recording on our telephone reservation line will alert you
that lower fares may be available on our Web site.").
176 See, e.g., SPIRIT AIRLINES, CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE § VI(a) (2001) ("Spirit Air-
lines is not responsible or liable for making connections, or for failing to operate
any flight according to schedule, or for changing the schedule of any flight.").
177 Solomon, supra note 37, at 19 ("And how do you set a dollar value on a
missed wedding, funeral or special occasion?"); see alsoJayne O'Donnell, Airline
Chiefs Vow Customer-Service Plans Will Improve, USA TODAY, June 8, 2001, at 2B
(quoting travel industry lawyer, "The judge is going to say 'What are your dam-
ages? ... You had a long-distance phone-call to relatives, dinner in the airport-
your damages are about $15.'").
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from Los Angeles, and known to the flight crew, ended up in
Orlando - without her luggage. 78 While difficulty in enforcing
rights is no argument for denying the legal recognition or crea-
tion of such rights, the PBOR legislation, rhetorically clothed in
the historically-significant title "Bill of Rights," nevertheless is
misleading and bound to exacerbate an already hostile passen-
ger culture. 79 Passengers likely and falsely will feel empowered.
An aggrieved air traveler may eagerly try to exercise through liti-
gation imagined, newly-created rights only to be further disap-
pointed that the precise, but limited scope, of the passengers'
rights bills penalize airlines more than they empower passen-
gers. This frustration may compound whatever antagonistic feel-
ings passengers already have, presuming that they will complain
to the air carrier itself before seeking judicial relief (although
the proposals do not make such consultation a condition prece-
dent to bringing suit). Practical and legal burdens passengers
might confront outweigh the presumed benefits of the PBOR
service-related contract rights. In any event, courts may be ill-
equipped to manage service-related passenger woes.
The persistent plaintiff-passenger likely will confront a court
system limited in terms of effectively translating and appraising
miserable air travel experiences into dollars and cents."" In-
deed, some carriers have expressly insulated themselves from
damages arising from service flaws.'' Inasmuch as they will be
difficult to enforce by law, service-related contract terms effec-
tively would have no more force than airline policy. Moreover,
the proposals fail to establish standards or legal mechanics a
178 George Lewis, America West Loses Track of Child at http://www.msnbc.com/
news/601174.asp (quoting the father, "I don't understand how she can get lost.
You lose luggage, you lose keys, you don't lose a child."). See generally, Julia Hall,
Air Travel From the Perspective of a Child: Why Did My Mother Pay for This?, 66J. AIR L.
& COM. 1681 (2001).
179 See supra text accompanying note 4 and supra discussion Part III.B.
18 See Lopez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 181, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(awarding bumped wedding guest $450 for "inconvenience, loss of time, anxiety
and frustration"); see also Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 567 F.2d 290, 292 (5th
Cir. 1978) (affirming $1,000 award to plaintiff-groomsman "for inconvenience,
inability to reach wedding rehearsal on time, missing part of the rehearsal din-
ner, being required to drive an automobile in mountainous territory, and the
cost of automobile rent"). See O'Donnell, Airline Chiefs Vow Customer-Service Plans
Will Improve, supra note 177, at 2B.
181 See, e.g., AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE (2001) (promis-
ing to provide notice of known delays, cancellations and diversions and disclaim-
ing "we are not responsible for any special, incidental, or consequential damages
if we do not meet this commitment.").
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court might use to compensate travelers. Unlike the standard of
strict liability that might apply in a tort case, it is not clear
whether violation of any given contract term - for instance, de-
lay - would allow an allegedly aggrieved passenger relief in
court without the imposition of any burden of proof or special
evidentiary standards. In circumstances where an airline is not
responsive or is perceived as insufficiently responsive, angry air-
line passengers likely will not be made whole by courts of law.
They will instead be confronted by an array of affirmative de-
fenses or summary resolution on the basis that the terms of any
contract of carriage are excusable and/or impossible to per-
form. Increased security issues arising from September 11, not
least of which are the possible needs to restrict some informa-
tion from the traveling public and institute longer pre-flight se-
curity checks, makes the point.
The proposed legislation also leaves important legal and pro-
cedural issues unresolved. As a practical matter, it is unclear
whether airlines would be permitted to change contract provi-
sions without giving notice to their passengers. 8 2 In addition to
facilitating class action suits and potentially opening the prover-
bial flood gates, the proposals do not limit the scope of potential
plaintiffs who might enforce these new rights as a matter of
standing. That is, as drafted, third-parties with only an attenu-
ated relationship to a contract for travel may nonetheless bring
suit because an airline had something to do with the travel plans
of another (i.e., if a friend is delayed in arriving for a special
occasion).183 In terms of remedy, the proposals collectively fail
to address whether airlines could seek contribution and/or in-
demnification from airport or government authorities if service-
related contract terms are breached because of ground and/or
flight operations beyond the control of the air carrier. In addi-
tion, the proposals are silent as to whether the government and
its departments would enjoy sovereign immunity if sued. The
proposals also fail to provide any limitations or mechanisms that
182 See, e.g., NATIONAL AIRLINES, CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE § 29 (2001) ("Carrier
reserves the right, to the extent not prohibited by federal law, to change, delete,
or add to any of the terms of this Contract without prior notice. All changes must
be in writing and must be available for public inspection at each of the Carrier's
ticket offices.").
183 Chukwu v. Bd. of Directors Varig Airline, 880 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mass. 1995)
(denying airline's motion for summary judgment in action alleging $3.5 million
in breach of contract damages because carrier refused to transport plaintiffs
brother).
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temper potential damage awards flowing from breaches of
promised services.' 84 As such, although contract assuredly is a
free-market vehicle through which parties allocate their relative
rights and liabilities, its likely effectiveness in maintaining or en-
hancing service is difficult to assess. This is particularly true
given a set of already existing passengers' rights rules.
Educating passengers about existing rights may be a better ap-
proach to improving airline service than creating new ones. For
example, so-called "Rule 240," a vestige of older regulations, re-
quires an airline to provide alternative travel or arrange for
transportation on another airline at no additional cost if it
cancels, delays or causes a missed connection. The fact that this
and other cooperative and long-standing rules have not soothed
passenger and government dissatisfaction forecasts the likely in-
effectiveness of any new legal imperatives. Importantly, extra-
legal issues such as inadequacies in the air traffic infrastructure
complicate the legal enforceability of any of the contract-based
proposed bills.'" 5 As the following discussion shows, it is doubt-
ful that any set of laws will meaningfully reduce or eliminate the
practical inefficiencies of modern air travel by focusing on a
qualitative assessment of airline service without also assessing in-
frastructure realities.
D. DEMAND MANAGEMENT
The substantive underpinnings of the PBOR legislation
center around asserted service deficiencies flowing from airline
management and suggest the need for so-called "demand man-
agement."'8 16 In promoting passengers' rights, legislators often
have identified airline business practices as a substantial source
of air travel service problems notwithstanding a concededly in-
adequate infrastructure. 8 7 This section details the issues and re-
lated arguments surrounding so-called demand management.
184 Lopez, 677 F. Supp. at 183 (noting that the trier of fact "must resist the
overwhelming temptation to recall the angst created by last second cancellations
or alterations of flight plans which jeopardize long cherished plans to participate
in some pleasurable and unique experience.").
185 See discussion infra Part III.D.1.
186 Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 316, 320
(1988) [hereinafter Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation] ("Most of us probably
did not foresee the deterioration in the average quality of the flying experience,
and in particular the congestion and delays that have plagued air travelers in
recent years.").
187 On April 5, 2000, Congress enacted the "Wendell H. Ford Aviation Invest-
ment and Reform Act for the 21st Century" (referred to as "AIR-21"), a $41 bit-
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1. (Over)Scheduling and Infrastructure
The PBOR initiative highlights a critical imbalance between
pre-September 11 deregulated airline management practices
and infrastructure realities. Industry and government statistics
corroborate passengers' common perception that domestic
commercial airline traffic is approaching, and sometimes
reaches, gridlock. Consumer complaints steadily increase from
year to year and, in 2000, a record one-in-four of flights were
delayed, cancelled, or diverted, with the average delay exceed-
ing fifty-two minutes. 8 These realities are linked, in part, to the
evolution of the so-called "fortress hub" at which one airline ac-
counts for at least the simple majority of an airport's total depar-
tures and arrivals (e.g., Delta at Atlanta, Northwest at Detroit,
(the former) TWA at St. Louis, and US Airways at Pittsburgh). I9
As a result, over seventy percent of commercial airline traffic is
concentrated at the nations' twenty-eight largest facilities, where
dominant carriers generally are immune to competitive disci-
pline.190 The consequences are two-fold: (1) passengers whose
travel originates at hub airports pay substantially higher fares
than spoke passengers in the form of a "hub premium;""19 and
lion government commitment to aviation infrastructure improvements. Pub. L.
No. 106-181, § 231 (2000) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 41714, 41716-18).
188 FINAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 7, 19; see also Airline Customer Service Improve-
ment Act, S. 319, 107th Cong. (2001) (summarizing an FAA report that, between
1995 and 2000, delays increased 90 percent and cancellations increased 104
percent).
189 E.g., Robert M. Hardaway, Taxi and Limousines: The Last Bastion of Economic
Regulation, 21 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 319, 328 (2000) ("many of the benefits
of airline deregulation have been dissipated by the lack of government antitrust
action to prevent the monopolization of airport resources and the creation of
fortress hubs."); Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: The-
my, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 393, 411 n.83 (1987) [herein-
after Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets] ("'Hub and spoke' systems
concentrate most of an airline's operations at one or a very few 'hub' cities, serv-
ing virtually every other city on the system nonstop from the hub and providing
predominantly one-stop or connecting service through the hub between cities on
the 'spokes.'").
190 Hearing Before the House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure Comm., Subcomm.
on Aviation, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of John Meenan, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, Industry Policy, Air Transport Association of America); see also Laurence
Zuckerman, Preserving Hub Networks Is the Carriers' Motivation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2001, at Cl.
19, James Pilcher, Effort to Reign in Hub Rates Offers Hope for Local Fliers, CINCIN-
NATi ENQUIRER, Feb. 1, 2001; Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Remain-
ing Role for Government Policy in the Deregulated Airline Industry, in DEREGULATION OF
NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT? 1, 5 (Sam Peltzman et al., eds., 2000).
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(2) structurally, the necessarily integrated hub-and-spoke system
is acutely susceptible to a domino or ripple effect, whereby de-
lays at hubs spread like viruses across a national network of
flights, thereby directly, substantially, and negatively impacting
activities at distant hubs and spokes. 9 2 The PBOR legislation
squarely confronts the propriety of the several major airlines'
hub-and-spoke business models and identifies the airlines' ap-
parent exploitation of an admittedly-wanting infrastructure as a
cause of passenger dissatisfaction. Yet, in examining the air-
lines' operations, passengers' rights proponents also necessarily
raise questions about the reasonableness of the demands passen-
gers make of the deregulated airline marketplace.19
The deregulated market prompts airlines to design route and
schedule systems that not only account for and anticipate pas-
senger demand, but also proactively match or exceed those of-
fered by competitors. This is so even at the risk of introducing
overcapacity or excess supply into the marketplace. As such, the
hub-and-spoke paradigm is a byproduct of intense, deregulated
competition, which motivates dominant carriers to maximize
the number of city-pair permutations in its route system by
"bunching [ ] closely-spaced arrivals and departures [in order to
push] their hubs to the very limits of the airports' physical ca-
pacity, or beyond it." '194 Naturally, this has generated an often
unmanageable volume of traffic in an environment in which a
carrier is hard-pressed to help ease airport congestion without
risking its corporate life; that is, "if it takes action and reduces
flights, . . . competitors [will] fill those slots, resulting in no
change in the overall flight scheduling at the airport." '195 The
PBOR legislation purports to remedy or approach remedies to
this problematic cycle insofar as the airlines have proved unwill-
ing and/or unable. While an individual airline is justified in
meeting the schedule demands of its passengers, legislators con-
tend that the airlines, in collectively failing to temper the num-
I 2' Flight Delays and Cancellations: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transp., 107th Cong. 8 (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General,
United States Department of Transportation) (illustrating that delay at Atlanta
hub comprised thirty-one percent of all system delays on a particular day).
193 Francillon, Softies and Gripers, supra note 136, at 30.
194 Brenner, supra note 8, at 213; see also Kaldahl, supra note 120, at 291-92
(asserting that "extreme competitive and economic pressures of deregulation"
have led, if not mandated, a reduction in the number of non-stop or point-to-
point flights in favor of the formation of the hub-and-spoke route paradigm).
195 FINAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 40.
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ber of flights offered relative to infrastructure capabilities, are
not providing the efficient travel passengers anticipate.
Proponents of the PBOR specifically contend that commercial
air transportation service woes are a result of the airlines' sched-
uling habits, which saturate a struggling infrastructure. An FAA
publication entitled "Airport Capacity Benchmark Report 2001"
supported this contention by juxtaposing airline scheduling pat-
terns with airport capacity. 9 6 The FAA concluded that airlines
appear to systematically schedule more flights than the nation's
airports can handle even under ideal conditions. For example,
the FAA reported that the capacity benchmark at New York's
LaGuardia airport was 80-81 flights per. hour in good weather,
representing traffic at or exceeding airport capacity most of the
day.197 Significantly, according to the FAA, this rate fell to a
maximum of 62-64 flights per hour in adverse weather condi-
tions, including "poor visibility, unfavorable winds or heavy pre-
cipitation."' 8 As the following illustration shows, in adverse
weather, scheduled traffic (the number of departure and arriv-
als) exceeded base-line capabilities at LaGuardia for twelve
hours of the day:' 99
196 DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRPORT CAPACITY BENCHMARK RE-
PORT 2001; see also David Bond, FAA 's Capacity Data Test Airlines, Airports, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH ., Apr. 30, 2001, at 52-53.
197 AIRPORT CAPACrrY BENCHMARK REPORT 2001, supra note 196, at Table 1; see
also Dateline NBC: The Plane Truth, The Waiting Game (NBC television broadcast,
Mar. 13, 2001) (reporting that, at Chicago's O'Hare, over sixty departures often
are scheduled in a fifteen-minute span though controllers can permit only half as
many in perfect weather).
198 AIRPORT CAPACITY BENCHMARK REPORT 2001, supra note 196, at Table 1.
199 Id. ("Demand at LaGuardia is expected to grow 17% over the next decade.
The imbalance between capacity and demand growth is expected to significantly
increase delays.")
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LGA-NEW YORK LAGUARDIA AIRPORT
Scheduled Departures and Arrivals and Current
Departure and Arrival Rate Boundaries (15-
Minute Periods) Under Reduced
Rate Conditions
TOTAL SCHRDOLED OPVR&TIONS AND CURIBaT 23DUCND RATS SOUNDARRIS
32
20
7 0 0 0 1U 12 13 10 IS 10 17 10 10 10 21
At that, the LaGuardia benchmark, like those prepared by the
FAA for each of the nation's major commercial airports, does
not consider limitations on airport traffic caused by taxiway and
gate congestion, runway crossings, slot controls, construction ac-
tivity, terminal airspace, and/or weather or congestion
problems at other airports. 2 °°
Unsurprisingly, the airlines have long refused the contention
that their scheduling practices are the cause in fact of airport
delays and passenger dissatisfaction. 20 ' To the contrary and to
the disgust of proponents of the PBOR, the airlines have por-
trayed themselves as relative victims of passenger vitriol fueled
by the practical consequences of severe infrastructure inadequa-
20O Id.
201 Preble, supra note 16, at 74 (quoting former American Airlines Chairman
and President, Robert L. Crandall, "Those who find fault with competitive sched-
uling practices must recognize that they are repudiating the principles of market-
place economics"). Another airline executive noted:
I submit that the answer to many of the problems plaguing today's
industry is not a re-regulation of the industry or laws governing how
big an employee's smile ought to be, but rather the only thing that
has ever altered industry behavior in America: the capitalistic cure
known as competition.
Aviation Competition Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 415 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of David Neeleman,
CEO, JetBlue Airways Corporation).
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cies beyond their control.2 °2 As one airline CEO suggested by
analogy:
If you're in a yellow cab in Lincoln Tunnel and it's stopped, you
don't get p-ed off at the cabdriver, because you see it's not up
to him. When you're on our airplane and it's a two-hour wait to
take off from Newark because the weather's bad in Cleveland
and the system's backing up, you think we're responsible.
20 3
Following this theme, airlines submit that the government's
own data demonstrates that only about eleven percent of delays
are related to airline schedules (i.e., "terminal volume") .2 14 As
such, the airlines reject arguments implicating their operations
under the banner of "demand management," opting to assign
blame for delays, diversions and cancellations on elements for
which the government is responsible.2 5 Specifically, airlines
(and others) contend that airport infrastructure - outdated ra-
dar, insufficient number of runways, over-crowded taxiing areas,
etc. - cries for a comprehensive overhaul. 20 6 The airlines' argu-
ment conceives of delays as inherent in the air traffic system and
existing a priori airline scheduling, which, in any event, is assert-
202 Brenner, supra note 8, at 213 ("Given the lag in airport and airway improve-
ment expenditures, part of this congestion was bound to happen with or without
deregulation.").
203 Adam Bryant, The View from the Top, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 2001, at 44.
204 Senate Aviation Subcomm. Hearing on Government and Industry-Wide Efforts to
Address Air Traffic Control Delays, 107th Cong. 4-5 (2001) (statement of Edward A.
Merlis, Senior Vice-President Legislative and International Affairs, Air Transpor-
tation Association of America).
205 Compare Senate Aviation Subcomm. Hearing on Aviation Delay Prevention, 107th
Cong. 3 (2001) (statement of Edward A. Merlis, Senior Vice-President Legislative
and International Affairs, Air Transportation Association of Anerica) ("We pre-
fer to look at this not as an 'overscheduling' issue, but as a failure to provide
adequate infrastructure issue; indeed, a failure to even commit to provide ade-
quate infrastructure.") with News Conference, FDCH Political Transcripts, Feb. 12,
2001, Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden Holds News Conference Regarding Airline
Passenger Rights (quoting Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.), "Sure, part of the problem
is the basic infrastructure, but the things that we're dealing with have nothing to
do with infrastructure .... It has everything to do with airlines having simple
good manners and having good business practices.").
206 Zack Van Eyck, Upgrading Airports and Traffic Systems is the Real Need, Airline
Executives Say, THE DESERT NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), June 10, 1999, at A03; see
also House Aviation Subcomm. Hearing on Airport Runway Construction Challenges,
107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of John Meenan, Senior Vice President, Indus-
try Policy, Air Transport Association of America) ("[I] t is vitally important that
the Congress focus on addressing the root cause of the problem - the lack of
adequate infrastructure - and not be misled to believe that legislation attacking
the symptoms of the problem (i.e., consumer complaints) will produce a satisfac-
tory result.").
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edly responsive to passenger demand. As a former United Air-
lines CEO reasoned: "Some people feel that change should
come solely from the airlines. They argue that we should ignore
the needs of our customers, cut back on schedules, and reduce
travel options. That's like insisting that General Motors cut back
on car production because of traffic congestion on aging high-
ways. ' 20 7 As such, the airlines suggest that Congress is targeting
airlines when it would be better served attending to underlying
infrastructure deficiencies. 08
Though recognizing infrastructure concerns long ago, the
government has done little to address such concerns.20 9 In
1988, Alfred Kahn set the stage:
This deprivation [of quality of service enjoyed by full-coach-fare-
paying passengers] has, however, resulted also from major dere-
lictions by governments. Congestion at major airports at peak
travel times (and the consequent inability of passengers to whom
time is very valuable to get the delay-free travel they would will-
ingly pay for) obviously means to an economist that the pertinent
government authorities have on the one hand failed efficiently to
expand airport and air traffic control capacity, and, on the other,
to price those scarce facilities at their marginal opportunity costs.
No wonder there are shortages. 2 10
Indeed, only six of the nations' largest airports completed
new runway projects in the last decade and, between 1995 and
2001, "only eight new runways opened at the top 100 air-
ports. '211 This is so, in part, because the current runway ap-
207 Jim Goodwin, Growing Pains, HEMISPHERES, June 2001, at 15.
208 SeeJim Burnley, System Problems Delay Flights, Impede Competition, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1999, at S26 ("[B]y focusing on customer service issues - as important as
they are - Congress avoids the hard choices that would have a positive impact on
the travelling public and the entire national economy. Instead, legislators pro-
pose to fine airlines for travel delays that are caused primarily by the govern-
ment's own inadequate system.").
209 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategies for Survival, 23
TRANSP. L.J. 15, 98 (1995) ("The U.S. government will have to face up to its obli-
gation to provide responsible oversight of this essential infrastructure industry to
enable it to rationalize capacity and stabilize pricing."). See also Airport Capacity
and Air Service Enhancement Act of 1990, H.R. 5056, 101st Cong. § 2(5) (1990)
(declaring that "the intent of Congress in enacting the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, to encourage competitive air transportation, has been thwarted by the
lack of capacity available for competitive entry at the Nation's airports.").
210 Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, supra note 186, at 321.
211 House Aviation Subcomm. Hearing Concerning H.R. 1407, Apr. 26, 2001, at 3
(statement ofJames L. Casey, Deputy General Counsel, Air Transport Association
of America). Some airlines have considered using regional airports to serve traf-
fic overflowing from major airports. See, e.g., Matthew Brelis, US Airways Scraps
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proval process takes in excess of ten years, involving the
negotiation and collaboration of almost a dozen local, state, and
federal bodies.212 Even without these obstacles, the FAA con-
cedes that "major improvements in providing capacity to meet
demand, such as new runways and the fielding of new air traffic
control capacity enhancing technology, are not going to be in
place for at least the next several years. ' 213 Whatever infrastruc-
ture repairs are made will be sufficient to keep up with current
traffic, only to be behind the curve again.2 "14 At that, capital and
"concrete" improvements such as new runways are not possible
at every major airport, 215 and, even where possible, sometimes
are opposed by communities barking a "not-in-my-backyard" re-
frain.216 Finally, passengers may pay a price for infrastructure
Plan to Use Hanscom, Cites Local Opposition, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 2001, at 4 (dis-
cussing "regionalization" strategy).
212 Congestion in the United States Transportation System: Hearing Before Full Senate
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 13 (2001) (concerning Senator
Kay Bailey Hutchinson's (R-Tex.) bill calling for expedited environmental re-
view.) See also Aviation Delay Prevention Act, S. 633, 107th Cong. (2001). Contra
Richard Kassel, Don't Speed Review Process, USA TODAY, Apr. 20, 2001, at 14A
("Americans want to fly without interminable delays, and we want to breathe
clean air and drink clean water. We shouldn't have to choose between the two.").
213 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT No. AV-2001-
020, EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW, FINAL REPORT ON AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE COMMIT-
MENT (2001), at 5, available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/is-
sues/service.pdf.
214 Air Traffic Congestion in the New York City Area: Hearing Before The Comm. on
Transp. and Infrastructure, Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of William R. DeCota, Director of Aviation, Port Authority of New
York and NewJersey) ("The sobering point is that any increases in capacity at the
most delayed airports in the country over the next ten years will be outstripped by
growth in flight operations."). See alsoJonathan D. Salant, FAA to Present 10-Year
Plan, MIAMI HERALD, June 5, 2001, at 3C (reporting FAA's proposal of an $11.5
billion, ten-year infrastructure and navigation improvement plan (the National
Airspace Operational Evolution Plan (NAS OEP)) calling for new automation
and use of secondary airports and providing, inter alia: (1) navigation via satellite
rather than radar technology; (2) encouraging free flight rather than flights
along fixed paths; (3) installation and use of newer weather-related equipment;
(4) permitting aircraft to fly closer together than the current requirement of
2,000 feet separation).
215 Geography essentially forecloses the possibility of building additional run-
ways at New York's LaGuardia airport, site of the nation's most frequently can-
celled and delayed flights in 2000. See AIRPORT CAPACITY BENCHMARK REPORT
2001, supra note 196. See, e.g., David Bond, Mica: Curbs on Demand Needed at Key
Airports, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECI., June 18, 2001, at 68.
216 See, e.g., Mark Sappenfield, The Unfinished Stoy of a Runway, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 12, 2001, at 1; Luis G. Zambrano, Comment, Balancing the Rights of
Landowners with the Needs of Airports: The Continuing Battle Over Noise, 66J. AIR L. &
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repairs in the form of taxes and fees appended to fares.217 In
addition to confronting higher fares or costs as an incident of
infrastructure overhaul, passengers and airlines soon may be
presented with questionable market-based options intended to
ease air traffic gridlock.
Several of the PBOR proposals revisit historic mechanisms in-
tended to relieve airport traffic problems, namely the granting
of limited antitrust immunity and/or so-called "congestion pric-
ing." A regulatory framework imposing congestion or peak
hour pricing means "airlines would be charged higher landing
fees at the busiest times at the major hub airports. This market-
based approach encourages travelers to fly during off-peak peri-
ods and reduces backup and delays. '218 The notion of conges-
tion pricing developed in 1968-69 in response to congestion at
the three major airports around New York City. The FAA and
the CAB implemented a peak-hour take-off fee of $25 for gen-
eral (as opposed to commercial) aviation aircraft. z 9 In addition,
the CAB promoted agreements among airlines to receive anti-
trust immunity to reduce scheduling competition.22 ° In the
same year, the FAA implemented the "High Density Rule"
whereby the number of hourly arrivals and departures at La-
Guardia was strictly limited.221 Now, three decades later, the
FAA has recommended the granting of antitrust immunity to
the airlines so that they might coordinate schedules to ease con-
gestion, peak-hour pricing (if possible), and a lottery for airport
222usage. 22 As a practical matter, congestion or peak hour pricing
theoretically would motivate major airlines to reduce the fre-
COM. 445 (2000); Kristin L. Falzone, Comment, Airport Noise Pollution: Is There A
Solution in Sight?, 26 B.C. ENVr'L. AFF. L. REv. 769 (1999).
217 David Ivanovich, A Tax to Clear the Tarmac: Ticket Fees May Ease Congestion,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1999, at 1.
218 Congestion in the United States Transportation System: Hearing Before Full Comm.
on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (2001).
211' See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 48, at 95; Stephen E. Creager, Note, Airline
Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J. 319, 326-27 (1983) (proposing
"allocating access to airports by auction, subjecting the airport terminal subleas-
ing policies of airlines to a heightened antitrust scrutiny, foreclosing the ability of
certain airlines to veto plans to expand airport terminal capacity, and requiring
new entrant airlines to bear the full cost of their entry"); Michael E. Levine, Land-
ing Fees and the Airport Congestion Problem, 12J.L. & ECON. 79 (1969); Aircraft Own-
ers and Pilots Ass'n v. Port Authority of New York, 305 F. Supp. 93 (1969).
220 Creager, supra note 219, at 327; see also Congress Mulls Delay Options; Panel
Seeks Antitrust Easing, AvIATION DAILY, Apr. 27, 2001, at 2.
221 14 C.F.R. § 93.121 (2002).
222 FINAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 12.
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quency of flights to a particular destination and use larger
planes with greater seating capacity. 221
The airlines dismiss antitrust immunity as "demand manage-
ment" that avoids supply or capacity management concerns. 924
While in 2001 several airlines rescheduled flights away from
peak times at airports where they enjoy a large or the largest
share of passenger volume, airlines are otherwise reluctant to do
so at airports where they do not enjoy similar market share. 2 5 As
such, antitrust immunity likely will be a benefit, if at all, only at
non-hub airports, where airlines must compete for take-off and
23 John Schmeltzer, Bigger Planes, Fewer Flights Address Delays, CHI. TRIB., May
18, 2001, at 1N. Query how, if at all, Airbus Industries's proposed long-range
airplane (the A380), which will be capable of seating more than 500 passengers,
will impact and/or exacerbate security concerns and/or documented conflicts
between passengers and crew. See discussion supra Part III.B and infra Part III.E.
224 Senate Aviation Subcomm. Hearing on Aviation Delay Prevention, Mar. 29, 2001,
(statement of Edward A. Merlis, Senior Vice-President Legislative and Interna-
tional Affairs, Air Transportation Association of America). See also David Bond,
Justice Dept. Backs Slot Auctions at LGA, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,July 15, 2002,
at 37 (reporting the Justice Department's view of congestion pricing as an infer-
ior market-based option because "[i]f the fee were increased too much, opera-
tions would be reduced unnecessarily; if too little, they would not be reduced
enough."). Consider a major airline CEO's remarks:
Q: Why are you opposed to this idea of congestion pricing, which is
a very businesslike, marketplace way of getting people who want to
travel at peak times to pay for it and to bring down the number of
people traveling at peak times?
A: I don't think it would have any impact on people traveling at
peak times. We already revenue-manage that equation. For exam-
ple, at LaGuardia at 5 p.m., we're not selling any $69 leisure fares.
All you're talking about doing is raising the costs further, which
we'll pass along to the consumer. If you're a businessman going to
New York and you need to put in a productive business day, you're
going to leave New York at 5 a.m. or 6 a.m. whether the fare is $10
or $15 higher, because if you waste 3 hours of your day in New York
you haven't accomplished anything. We think it would be simply
the raising of the costs of doing business rather than effectively
changing the patterns of the use of the air traffic control system.
Air Delays Will Ease, but Not Before 2003, USA TODAY,June 21, 2001, at 15A (report-
ing interview with Don Carty, American Airlines chairman).
225 Senate Aviation Subcomm. Hearing on Government and Industry-Wide Efforts to
Address Air Traffic Control Delays, May 10, 2001, at 3 (statement of Edward A. Mer-
lis, Senior Vice-President Legislative and International Affairs, Air Transportation
Association of America) ("While a number of carriers have been able to smooth
out the scheduling peaks at airports where they have the most traffic, it is at
airports with large numbers of competitors that the antitrust immunity is neces-
sary to facilitate carrier scheduling coordination to levels below the
benchmarks.").
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landing slots. 226 The ATA expressed the following pointed and
yet-unresolved questions that identify some of the issues associ-
ated with the concept of congestion pricing:
" To what extent will air traffic controllers, both on approach
and en route, shuffle aircraft for which congestion-pricing pre-
miums have been levied on passengers?
" How will congestion pricing be established and who will be re-
sponsible for setting it?
" Will congestion pricing serve as an excuse not to expand ca-
pacity to meet unmet and growing demand?
" How will traffic from small and midsize communities be able to
bear the incremental costs arising from peak hour pricing? To
what extent would such a system disenfranchise residents of
these communities from the national network?
" To what extent will public policy exemptions - small communi-
ties, new entrants, business jets, or government aircraft to
name just a few - result in just as much congestion but at
higher prices from those not exempted?
" Should a congestion-pricing scheme be revenue-neutral, so as
not to build up tempting surpluses that local officials will inevi-
tably seek to siphon off the airport?
* Even if a congestion pricing system is revenue-neutral, should
the terms by which grand-fathered airports operate be
changed to preclude them from using these funds for non-avi-
ation purposes?
" How will congestion pricing affect feeder traffic flow from
small planes and communities that may not be able to afford
the peak hour surcharge? Without that feeder traffic and with
fewer passengers on the connecting long haul over which the
surcharges are spread, to what extent will the scheme have the
potential to further increase prices on tickets elsewhere in the
network?227
Demand management as an incident of passengers' rights not
only considers the practices and conduct of airlines, but also
evaluates the composition and relative health of the airline in-
dustry as a whole.
2. Industry Consolidation and Market Entry
In the noticeable absence of active antitrust enforcement, sev-
eral of the PBOR proposals consider legal and regulatory mech-





the deregulated airline market.2 8 Some proposals contem-
plated allowing the DOT, if three or fewer carriers accounted
for seventy percent or more of scheduled air travel, to order an
airline to reduce a fare, offer a reduced fare for certain seats on
a certain route, and offer rebates if such airline was determined
to be charging an "unreasonably high" fare.229 More forcefully,
Senator Reid introduced "The Airline Competition Preservation
Act of 2001," mandating a moratorium on all airline mergers
and acquisitions. 2t1 In promoting such legislation, Senator Reid
stated:
[N]o one wants the federal government to micro manage private
industry. But our airways are notjust a private industry - they are
a public trust .... If these mergers proceed without the competi-
tive protections I am proposing, then the ultimate irony of der-
egulation will be that we will have traded government concern
for the public interest, for private monopoly control in the inter-
ests of the industry.23'
As such, the PBOR legislation is important in that it invokes
more than purely service-related issues; it also implicates the
functionality of economic deregulation.
Underlying the considered legislation is the predicate that
modern airline service has suffered because competition has vir-
tually been evicted from the marketplace and thwarted by un-
lawful airline management strategies designed to destroy actual
competitors and deter potential ones. Before deregulation, gov-
ernment policies insulated the early, few commercial airlines
from cutthroat and destructive competition. Sharing the air-
lines' fear of merciless rivalry in a Darwinistic marketplace, the
CAB guarded an oligopoly of air carriers and maintained the
status quo by steadfastly restricting market entry.232 In this envi-
228 Alfred Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1059, 1060 (1986)
(explaining that deregulation policy is not inconsistent with antitrust enforce-
ment: "Preserving equality of competitive opportunity is not, in principle, the
same thing as suppressing or supplanting competition."); see also Frank N. Wilner,
Unjoining the Twins: Separating Air Traffic Control from Aviation Safety Has Impressive
Support but Strong Labor Opposition, TRAFFIC WORLD, Mar. 5, 2001, at 14 (quoting
former CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn: "The solitary failure of deregulation is the
failure of government to respond. The best way to respond is not a passenger bill
of rights but for government to get the hell out of the way.").
229 H.R. 4978, 106th Cong. (2000).
230 S. 199, 107th Cong. (2001).
261 147 Cong. Rec. 5650 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2001).
232 Carstensen, supra note 119, at 112-13 ("The [CAB] had become a protector
of existing airlines by blocking entry, frustrating price competition, and generally
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ronment, "failure was impossible." '33 The resulting market stag-
nancy generated by the CAB's rules, regulations and practices
gradually eroded and aviation regulatory reform, if not deregu-
lation, arose. 234 As commercial airline travel became more com-
monplace, the CAB's anticompetitive propensities appeared
unacceptably to override the public utility of commercial airline
transportation.235 In its place, the Deregulation Act sought to
promote free market competition and to encourage "entry into
air transportation markets by new carriers," but not at the cost
of "unreasonable industry concentration, excessive market dom-
ination, and monopoly power. '121 6 The PBOR legislation point-
edly suggests that the Deregulation Act has failed to affect this
promise.
Ultimately and ironically, over time the Deregulation Act has
fostered a mature commercial airline market that may reflect
undesired aspects present under the CAB's governance. In
other words, airline deregulation, from the perspective of pro-
ponents of the PBOR, may promote the very variety of destruc-
setting rates that allowed airlines very good returns. In the 1960s a general reac-
tion to excessive intervention in price and entry conditions began to grow.").
233 PETZINGER, JR., supra note 130, at 15.
2-34 AN-rHONY E. BROWN, THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1987); see also
Behrman, supra note 109, at 97 n.90 (noting that "debates on reducing CAB reg-
ulation commonly focused not on 'airline deregulation' but on 'aviation regula-
tory reform' . . . [and that] no prominent regulation-reducing bill before 1978
had the word 'deregulation' in its title ... [bearing, instead] such titles as 'Avia-
tion Act,' 'Air Transportation Act,' 'Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act,'
and 'Air Service Improvement Act'") (internal citations omitted); Louis J. Hec-
tor, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931
(1960).
235 See Herbert D. Kelleher, Deregulation and the Practicing Attorney, 44J. AIR L. &
COM. 261, 270 (1978) ("In instances in which a new applicant proposes an inno-
vative service which threatens an existing carrier with serious competition, the
Board always has struggled with the problem until it found a way to resolve it in
favor of the established carrier."); Edward M. Kennedy, Comment, The American
Airlines [sic] Industry and the Necessity of Deregulation, 9 AKRON L. REV. 631, 631
(1976) ("Over the long run, the most damaging authority exercised by the CAB is
clearly its power to prevent new entry ... by new enterprises into the airline
industry market itself."); James C. Kitch, Some Observations on Moss v. CAB, 23
STAN. L. REV. 833, 843 (1971) (asserting that "[t]he CAB is in effect a cartel man-
ager... [whose] traditional role in ratemaking is more conducive to preserving
industry peace than to protecting the public interest.").
236, Airline Deregulation Act of .1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 102(7), (10), 92
Stat. 1705, 1706-07 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)).
988
2002] R-REGULATION AND RIGHTS 989
tive competition around which the CAB navigated.237 The
resulting environment exhibits features inconsistent with theo-
ries of perfect market contestability, including: mergers and
consolidation, 238 dominance and near-monoplization of hub-
and-spoke systems, complex fare structures,239 frequent flyer
programs, predation, manipulation of travel agents and comput-
erized reservation systems, firm strategies centered around ac-
quisition and maintenance of slots and gates, and new entrant
casualties.24 ° Competition that flourished in the early stages of
237 Oster & Strong, supra note 68, at 15 n.16 (reporting that a United Airlines
subsidiary purchased and briefly used the exchange "1-800-SOUTHWEST" as its
reservations number).
238 Several commentators posit that the actual impact of market consolidation
"may be less harmful than is generally expected" because
[C]onsolidation lowers competition, which tends to reduce welfare.
At the same time, consolidation increases traffic densities in the
networks of the surviving carriers. Since higher densities reduce
costs, this effect tends to raise welfare. If the economies of density
are sufficiently strong, the cost effect will overshadow the effect of
lost competition, leading to a welfare gain. This outcome is in fact
familiar from standard oligopoly models, which show that industry
consolidation in the presence of increasing returns can be welfare-
improving.
Jan K. Brueckner & Pablo T. Spiller, Economies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated
Airline Industry, 37J.L. & ECON. 379, 408 (1994). Another study corroborates this
reasoning, surmising that industry consolidation may bring beneficial density
gains that off-set the effect of lost competition because
if fewer effective competitors exist at the national level, deregula-
tion has not necessarily decreased airline competition: for it is at
the route level that airlines compete head to head. For example,
four effective competitors at the national level can operate in two
very different ways: with each having a monopoly share on one-
quarter of the routes or with each having a one-quarter share on all
routes. Although the number of airlines is the same either way, the
second situation is obviously more competitive because more air-
lines serve each route. Thus fewer effective competitors at the na-
tional level does not necessarily mean that the industry is less
competitive.
STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE IN-
DUSTRY 9 (The Brookings Institute 1995) (emphasis in original); see also Frank,
supra note 9 (suggesting that consolidation may resolve overcapacity concerns).
But see Gesell & Farris, supra note 8, at 114-15.
239 Margaret A. Peteraf & Randal Reed, Pricing and Performance in Monopoly Air-
line Markets, 37J.L. & ECON. 193 (1994).
240 Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets, supra note 189, at 408-18;
Bettina M. Whyte & Michael B. Cox, Airline Industry Restructuring: From Stuck in the
Mud to Flying High, 16-JUN AM. BANKR. INST.J. 24, 25 (1997) ("Since 1978, airline
deregulation in the United States has been characterized by periods of over-ca-
pacity, bankruptcy, price discounting, fuel shortages, labor strife, government in-
tervention, as well as the free market consequences of management mistakes.").
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deregulation diminished significantly in the last two decades,
prompting Congressional proponents of the PBOR to suggest
that "[m]ost of us would not have voted to deregulate if we
thought it would mean a deterioration to only three carriers.
241
In fact, ten years after implementation of the Deregulation Act,
Alfred Kahn concluded:
Just as one of the most pleasant surprises of the early deregula-
tion experience was the large-scale entry of new, highly competi-
tive carriers, so probably the most unpleasant one has been the
reversal of that trend - the departures of almost all of them, the
reconcentration of the industry both nationally and at the major
hubs, the diminishing disciplinary effectiveness of potential entry
by totally new firms, and the increased likelihood, in conse-
quence, of monopolistic exploitation.
Were these developments surprises? Yes, to a large extent.
24 2
The very presentation of passengers' rights legislation poten-
tially exposes the deregulation assumption of contestability
within the deregulated airline market.
From its beginning, the deregulated airline market was
trumpeted as one that would be perfectly contestable. "The
contestable market assumption is that there are no signifi-
cant... barriers to entry [and] [b]ecause there are no barriers
to entry, the market, even in the absence of actual competition,
is threatened (i.e., contested) by a prospective new entrant.
Hence, the market is expected to behave in a perfectly competi-
tive way."' 24 3 Actual (or threatened) competition, in turn, was
imagined to benefit air travelers in the form of carrier choice
and/or competitive fares and services. Yet, significant and myr-
iad mergers, take-overs or bankruptcies typified the first full dec-
ade of U.S. deregulation, thus exposing important theoretical
assumptions informing deregulation policy.244 As one commen-
241 Janet L. Fix, Picture of Airline Deregulation Not As Pretty As It Was Meant to Be,
DErROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 28, 2001, at 26 (quoting Representative Jim Oberstar
(D-Minn.)).
242 Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, supra note 186, at 318 (citations
omitted).
24" Gesell & Farris, supra note 8, at 115; see also Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J.
Baumol, Deregulation and the Theary of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111,
113 (1984) ("Formally, a market is defined to be perfectly contestable if no price
in that market can be in equilibrium when its magnitude is such as to enable an
entrant to undercut it and nevertheless earn a profit.").
244 Jeffrey S. Heuer & Musette H. Vogel, Airlines in the Wake of Deregulation:
Bankruptcy as an Alternative to Economic Reregulation, 19 TRANsP. L.J. 247 (1991)
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tator noted, "[t]he vision of the deregulated airline industry as
effectively competitive suggested that merger policies developed
under the antitrust laws would suffice for whatever mergers and
acquisitions might transpire. In this the proponents were
wrong. ' 245 In 1986, eighteen national carriers became eight vis-
A-vis notable corporate deaths such as Air California, Air Florida,
Braniff, Pan Am, and National, and several mergers such as
Northwest and Republic, TWA and Ozark, USAir and Piedmont,
Delta and Western, and Texas Air bingeing on Continental, Peo-
ple Express, New York Air and the venerable Eastern Airlines. 24 6
More recently, in January, 2000, American Airlines announced
its (now-consummated) purchase of history-rich TWA, and, in
May, 2000, United Airlines and US Airways announced plans to
pursue a merger, which eventually was thwarted by the Depart-
ment of Justice.247 In any event, the proposed PBOR legislation,
some of which purports to freeze current, arguably insufficient,
competition levels does nothing to inject competition into the
marketplace.
(arguing that "bankruptcy, which functions at a microeconomic level, more ade-
quately serves the entire airline industry than direct government regulation").
The terrorist attacks of September 11 catalyzed the bankruptcy of US Airways,
Vanguard, Midway, and Sun Country, and led United Airlines to suggest the pos-
sibility of its own bankruptcy filing in late 2002.. See infra note 246.
245 Almarin Phillips, Airline Mergers in the New Regulatory Environment, 129 U. PA.
L. REv. 856, 857 (1981) [hereinafter Airline Mergers]. See, e.g., Robert G. Berger &
Stephanie J. Mitchell, Predatory Pricing in the Airline Industry: A Case Study - The
Policies and Practices of the CAB, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 287 (1984); Joseph F. Brodley,
Antitrust Policy Under Deregulation: Airline Mergers and the Theory of Contestable Mar-
kets, 61 B.U. L. REv. 823 (1981) (examining CAB's approach toward airline
merger); Lucile Sheppard Keyes, A Preliminary Appraisal of Merger Control under the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 46J. AIR L. & CoM. 71 (1980).
246 See generally, L. Milton Glisson, Is U.S. Domestic Airline Competition on a Night
to Oblivion?, 58 TRANSP. PRAc. J. 217, 218 (1991); Robert L. Thornton, Airlines and
Agents: Conflict and the Public Welfare, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 371, 396 (1986) (con-
cluding "[i]f [the DOT] fail[s] to act soon, the number of effective competitors
in the airline industry may fall below the point from which deconcentration is
possible without a major crisis"); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy
in Transportation: Monopoly I$ the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REv. 505, 514 (1987);
see also Airline Mergers, supra note 245 at 880 ("The nation may be left with a really
small number of large, quasi-monopolistic and not necessarily efficient carriers").
Whether a function of deregulation or otherwise, consolidation in the airline
industry finds parallels in other important sectors. See, e.g., YochiJ. Dreazen et al.,
Why the Sudden Rise in the Urge to Merge and Form Oligopolies?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25,
2002, at AlO (quoting economist Carl Shapiro, "Twenty [competitors] to four is
good. It's four to two that is much more dubious.")
247 Brown & Headley, supra note 7, at 7 ("Continuing decline in industry ser-
vice quality should be regarded as a primary reason to oppose the current merg-
ers and acquisitions being proposed.").
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Less regulation (but not necessarily less antitrust enforce-
ment) and practical efforts likely will resolve market concentra-
tion issues more effectively than the PBOR legislation. In terms
of regulation, less restrictive laws respecting cabotage that allow
non-U.S. air carriers to serve domestic routes may inject needed
competition into the deregulated marketplace. 24 8 (Of course,
the events of September 11 raise a number of potential issues,
including national security, that may militate against liberalized
cabotage rights.) Greater privatization of airports also may be
more effective than legislation.249 Additionally, infrastructure
improvements likely will alleviate concerns respecting preda-
tion.25° In all, "demand management" may be epithetic for "re-
regulation," and indicative of the mood of federal legislators
now and/or when (and if) airline travel resumes to pre-Septem-
ber 11 traffic levels.
E. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: A NEW ROLE FOR AIRLINE PASSENGERS
Since 1999, passengers' rights issues have come full circle,
from an affirmative movement for more rights to a necessary
248 See, e.g., Kirsten B6hmann, The Ownership and Control Requirement in U.S. and
European Union Air Law and U.S. Maritime Law - Policy; Consideration; Comparison,
66J. AIR L. & CoM. 689, 690 n.3 (2001) (noting that "[c]abotage is commonly
defined as carriage of passengers and goods between two points within the terri-
tory of the same nation for compensation or hire"); Eli A. Friedman, Comment,
Airline Antitrust: Getting Past the Oligopoly Problem, 9 U. MiAmi Bus. L. REV. 121, 143
(2001) (contending that "[t]he only way that a competitive, growing market can
take hold with a considerable, long-term effect on price and service is if domestic
and foreign airlines are able to individually establish competing hub and spoke
systems on a domestic and international level, while in compliance with the anti-
trust laws"); RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19
(2001) ("The airline industry is a paradox. In terms of its operations, it is the
most international of industries, yet in terms of ownership and control it is almost
exclusively national"); W. M. Sheehan, Comment, Air Cabotage and the Chicago
Convention, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1950).
249 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2001) ("The system
is near gridlock and needs to be controlled by a responsive, independent entity
like has been done in Canada and is being done in the U.K."); Soon-kil Hong &
Kwang Eui Yoo, A Study on Airport Privatization in Korea: Policy and Legal Aspects of
Corporatization and Localization Over Airport Management, 66 J. AIR L. & CoM. 3, 5
(2000) ("[P]rivatization refers to shifting governmental functions and responsi-
bilities, to the private sector, in whole or in part.").
250 Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise Improvement, and Intermodal
Transportation Act of 1992, H.R. 6168, § 2(14), 102d Cong. (1992) (finding that
"the opportunities for new entrants and financially weak airlines to compete suc-
cessfully can be maximized by the development of new airport capacity, particu-
larly terminal facilities and gates").
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and relative contraction of such rights.25' Questions concern-
ing, for example, an airline's provision of information with re-
spect to delays and cancellations have been superceded by
questions concerning passenger privacy rights.2 5 2 Indeed, con-
ceptions of airline service itself have changed. September 11 in-
troduced a transition in the focus of the passengers' rights
initiative from service to security. Passengers now may measure
service as a function of security.2 53 Yet, more security may mean
fewer rights, constitutional and otherwise.254
Post-September 11, passengers are subject to unprecedented
examination and scrutiny. There exists a perverse differentia-
tion of passengers who (merely) are out of control and/or dan-
gerous (vis-' -vis "air rage") from actual terrorists.2 55 For
example, an American Airlines pilot had removed from his
plane an Arab-American who was a plain-clothes Secret Service
251 Nancy Fonti, Long Delays for People Stuck on Planes Spark Calls for Changes,
'Passengers'Rights, 'ATLANTAJ.-CONST.,Jan. 4, 2002, at IA (quoting ATA president,
David Stempler, "The whole passengers bill of rights since Sept. 11 has really
gone off the radar screens .... We've got airlines that are bleeding red ink in
barrels. There's the question of their survivability. It would be hard to press on
them any more requirements."); see alsoJayne O'Donnell, Fliers'Rights Take Back
Seat to Security, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2001, at 3B.
252 See, e.g., Robert L. Crandall, Security for the Future: Let's Get Our Airlines Flying
in Symposium, Airline Security and Economic Symposium - Freedom Versus Fear: The
Future of Air Travel, 67J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 19 (2002) [hereinafter Crandall, Let's
Get Our Airlines Flying] ("You want to travel on the airline system? You give up
your privacy. You don't want to give up your privacy? Don't fly. Your privacy
isn't equal to the safety of the rest of us.").
253 Greg Griffin, Who's Minding the Customer?, DENVER POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at K-
04 (quoting Kevin Mitchell, "Customer service can be defined in many ways.
Clearly, after Sept. 11 there's a blurry line between what is service and what is
security. Many people are viewing the two as one and the same.").
254 E.g., Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Attacks on America - Privacy Implications of Height-
ened Security Measures in the United States, Europe, and Canada, 67 J. AiR L. & CoM.
83 (2002). In 1998, counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union suggested:
A passenger "Bill of Rights" should be posted at ticket counters to
inform passengers of their rights; such as the right to refuse to pre-
sent identification if they choose to travel anonymously, their right
to refrain from answering intrusive questions or to be subjected to
intrusive security measures; the consequences, if any, of exercising
these rights; and the way to contact the entity to which complaints
of security-related abuses should be directed.
Gregory T. Nojeim, Aviation Security Profiling and Passengers' Civil Liberties, 13 AiR &
SPACE LAw. 3, 9 (1998).
255 Elinor J. Brecher, Stressed-Out Passengers Challenge Flight Crews, MIAMI HER-
ALD, Feb. 26, 2002, at lB.
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agent allegedly exhibiting suspicious conduct. 256 As such, the
subtext associated with the phrase "passengers rights" has
shifted from one portraying the air traveler as a proverbial vic-
tim of corporate largess needing legally enforceable rights
against an uncaring system to a utilitarian one recommending
that travelers' individual freedoms be restricted for the benefit
and safety of the general traveling society.
In the aftermath of September 11, President George W. Bush
and Congress encouraged citizens to go about their normal rou-
tines, particularly if these routines involved commercial air
travel. Vice-President Richard B. Cheney, too, spoke of a new
reality that confronted traveling Americans, a sort of "new nor-
malcy." This "new normalcy" likely will have unforeseen con-
tours: long lines in airport terminals,257 multiple security
obstacles,258 commercial pilots armed with electronic tasers or
other weapons, 259 flight crews trained in self-defense, 260 airplane
'56 Pilot, Secret Service Agent Trade Charges (Jan. 5, 2002), at http://
www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/01/03/secret.service.agent/index.html; see also
Jonathan D. Salant, Officials Debate Use of Ethnicity in Profiling Passengers, MIAMI
HERALD, July 5, 2002, at 20A.
257 Blake Morrison, Federal Officers to Police Airports, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2002,
at IA (discussing initial testing with members of Congress and flight crews with a
card designed to speed travelers through the security process).
258 See, e.g., Edward Wong, Bearable Airport Delays but Massive Security Face Trav-
elers in New Era, MIAMI HERALD, July 7, 2002, at 19A; Jane Costello & Nicole Har-
ris, Adapting to Air Travel, 2002, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at BI (documenting
methods passengers employ to hasten security checks, from packing in clear
plastic bags and avoiding clothing with metal to piling "dirty, smelly workout gear
toward the top of [ ] luggage to deter security personnel from digging further
in").
259 OnJuly 10, 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives, by a vote of 310 to 113,
approved legislation that would allow guns for more than 70,000 commercial air-
line pilots who agreed to undergo training. Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act,
H.R. 4635, 107th Cong. (2002). In September 2002, the U.S. Senate, by a vote of
87 to 6, similarly voted to allow guns in cockpits to prevent hijackings. Sara
Kehaulani Goo, Senate Votes to Allow Pilots to Cariy Guns, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2002,
at A08. President George W. Bush voiced objection to the concept of arming
airline pilots. See William B. Scott, Battle Lines Drawn Over Arming Airline Pilots,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 18, 2002, at 45.
260 James Pilcher, Delta to Offer Self-Defense Courses to Attendants, CINCINNATI EN-
QUIRER, Feb. 13, 2002. See also Frances Fiorino, Airline Crews to be Taught New
Defensive Measures, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 28, 2002, at 48.
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cabins equipped with video cameras,2 6 1 and passengers pre-
pared to defend themselves and (or from) other passengers.262
To be sure, the passive role airline passengers have enjoyed so
far likely will have to yield to a more active one.263 Airlines and
passengers, collectively, must effectuate improved service and se-
curity. As one commentator suggests: "an individual, not a bu-
reaucracy, can ensure airline safety. ' 264  Citizens' "initial,
automatic and perhaps, habitual reaction to crisis is to look to
an outside authority to legislate, regulate, and lay blame ... and
our policymakers have learned that we prefer, or will be pacified
by, the 'quick fix' of a machine rather than the more arduous
261 Martha Brannigan, Delta Will Begin Testing Video Cameras That Permit Surveil-
lance of Passengers, WALL ST.J., Oct. 30, 2001, at 10B (quoting pilot, "Job privacy or
personal civil rights really aren't an issue. Everyone knows we're in a risk-man-
agement environment.").
262 Bob Keefe, Class Teaches Passengers How to Combat Terrorism in the Air, AT-
LANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 19, 2002, at ID (discussing $350 classes offered by Flight
Watch America, Inc., which instructs not "self-defense or hand-to-hand combat,
[but] . . .awareness, preparation and just plain common sense" and reporting
that post-September 11, 2001, eighty-two percent of surveyed airline passengers
said they would lead an attack to prevent terrorists from taking control of a
plane). See LONGMAN, supra note 1.
263 One author suggests:
[t]he air traveller represents an under-rated human factors issue in
a system that has grown very fast and places a high degree of trust
in regulatory and enforcement measures to solve many of its
problems. The air traveller as an active participant in on-board
safety has received little positive acknowledgment.
The airlines so far have failed to embrace passengers as important
participants in maintaining a socially safe on-board environment.
Passengers at large are treated as commodities.
Angela Dahlberg, Airlines Need to Turn More of Their Attention to Passenger-Related
Human Factors, ICAO JOURNAL, June 2001, at 15. Another commentator writes:
The public will bear the additional expenses needed to improve
aviation security, but is this where public responsibility ends? Do
the passenger surcharges and user fees that characterize current
transportation policy entitle the passenger to share in the security
process itself? ... The idea still prevalent in our laws and policies -
that the public will pay more, yet will remain uninvolved in the pro-
cess - reflects the naivety of the "welfare state" policies of yester-
year. We are living a myth if we think that we can successfully avoid
becoming involved, yet have aviation security improved. Govern-
ment is not a bottomless pit of funds, nor has it shown itself to be
an unbiased champion of our security interests.
N.J. Strantz, From Technology to Teamwork: Aviation Security Reform Since Pan Am
Flight 103, 3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 235, 251 (1993).
264 Jamie L. Rhee, Comment, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline
Safety in the Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 847, 849 (2000).
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task of behavioral change. '265 The September 11 terrorist at-
tacks suggest that U.S. airline passengers modify their behavior,
not just hope for new sets of laws and/or regulations.
At bottom, the events of September 11 illuminate the reasons
why the PBOR legislation cannot work: necessary change must
occur at a social and behavioral level, not solely at Capitol Hill.
As a matter of business and practical sense, airlines must attract
potential passengers (particularly business travelers) 266 by mar-
keting and articulating a need to fly, not just the associated con-
venience and value of commercial flight.267
IV. CONCLUSION
While the flawed PBOR legislation likely will die in commit-
tee, again, passengers' rights, conceptually and subsequent to
September 11, is as important an issue as ever. In the short
term, the PBOR legislation consists of nothing more than a set
of normative proposals that do nothing to alter passenger be-
havior or create business incentives for airlines with respect to
service. In the long-term, however, the PBOR legislation crafted
over the last few years represents a sort of "fork-in-the-road" at
which deregulation proponents and would-be regulators must
decide, conclusively, whether deregulation is sustainable with re-
spect to airline service or whether re-regulation of some variety
is required.268 Of course,
265 Strantz, supra note 263, at 251.
266 See, e.g., Michael Mecham, Flying Less, Irritated More - Biz Travelers Sound Off
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 29, 2002, at 64-65; Chris Woodyard, Charter
Industry Siphons Executive Fliers, USA TODAY, May 17, 2001, at 6B.
267 One commentator opines:
Because of Sept. 11, passengers are being treated worse now than
before - the lines are longer, the demands on customers are more
intrusive, no-frills service has taken on new meaning. But the pas-
sengers can't complain - to do so would sound unpatriotic. In the
name of safety - and for good reason - the airports are being run
in a way that would have been unrecognizable before Sept. 11.
Because of this, the airlines are probably safer today than they were
back in August. Which is why safety will not be the underlying rea-
son people continue to stay away from airports.
The real reason comes down to something that has been building
for years, and that has been reported upon here even before Sept.
11 - something that can be summed up in a slogan protestors used
to write on signs they waived at Dwight D. Eisenhower's secretary of
state before he went off on far-flung foreign travels: "Is this trip
necessary?"
Bob Greene, Safety Isn't the Airlines' Only Worry, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2001, at 1C.
268 Several commentators note, for example:
996
2002] RE-REGULATION AND RIGHTS
[w]e should be particularly careful to consider only changes in
the regulatory environment that do not give a public agency con-
tinuing domestic regulatory responsibilities or require a series of
ongoing judgments about which offerings to the public are or
are not in the public interest. Rather... we should, for example,
consider how we may restructure business incentives . . ."
Inasmuch as Congress has entertained the concept of enforcea-
ble passengers' rights several times over the last decade, each
cycle of legislation more enthused than previous attempts, it is
likely that the issue will present again .2 " This may be so unless
the airlines affirmatively pursue a campaign to communicate
that their services and product are necessary, convenient, and
valuable. Until then, it remains to be seen whether ".... as long
as the temptation to let the government do 'just a little' re-regu-
lating can be resisted, a deregulated airline industry will deliver
its product efficiently and economically. '" 271
After more than twenty years of airline deregulation, it is time to
start thinking about a long-run policy equilibrium. In other words,
what remaining steps, if any, should policymakers take to enhance
competition in the deregulated environment so that carriers can be
free of periodic government interventions and can focus entirely
on becoming as efficient as possible?
Morrison & Winston, supra note 191, at 3-4; Jerry Ellig & Wayne H. Winegarden,
Airline Policy and Consumer Welfare, 61 TRANSP. L.J. 411, 430 (1994) ("From a con-
sumer perspective, whatever ails the industry, it isn't too little regulation."); see
also Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatoy Failure as Catalysts for
Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46
WASH. & LEE L. Ruv. 1 (1989); Kahn, Airline Deregulation, supra note 8, at 238-39
("The question for public policy is always whether the imperfections are so severe
as tojustify comprehensive regulation of the kind that we practiced in the airline
industry before 1978").
269 Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets, supra note 189, at 494.
270 As Robert Crandall predicts:
I think all of this federal involvement inevitably will lead to more
discussion of whether or not there needs to be some regulation.
Particularly, I think you'll get that discussion if, as a consequence of
the economic travail [after September 11 ], airlines seek to combine
themselves. And if they seek to combine themselves so that the
number of competing airlines shrinks, there may very well be a de-
bate about whether some regulation to substitute for that now-ab-
sent competition is required.
I hope it won't go back to a regulated system. I think the deregu-
lated system works better. It does not fulfill all the same social
objectives, but it gives a materially better economic result.
Crandall, Let's Get Our Airlines Flying, supra note 252, at 23-24.
271 Kelleher, How the Airlines Met Adam Smith, supra note 108, at 318. As one
prominent, former airline executive suggests:
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Given the importance of the nation's airline industry, we must all
hope that the marketplace will guide the airlines to solutions con-
sistent with the continued availability of convenient, competitively
priced transportation services for cities across America. As the in-
dustry works out its problems, the government should stand back
and let the market do its job - while avoiding actions that will
make things worse.
Robert Crandall, What Next for the Airlines?, WASH. Posr, Aug. 15, 2002, at A25.
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